GHSA-3MR9-P497-58F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 19:43 – Updated: 2026-08-06 19:43Summary
Contao's crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes Cookie and Authorization headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names basic_auth and bearer_auth instead of Symfony HttpClient's real auth_basic and auth_bearer options.
When contao.crawl.default_http_client_options contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the "clean" client used for external links or configured additional URIs. An attacker who can get an external URL crawled, for example through a link on a crawled page while the broken-link checker is enabled, can receive the crawler credentials.
Technical Detail
Root Cause
// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:175-209 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0
private function createHttpClient(array $options = []): HttpClientInterface
{
$options = array_merge_recursive(
[
'headers' => [
'accept' => 'text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8',
'user-agent' => self::USER_AGENT,
],
'max_duration' => 10,
],
array_merge_recursive($this->getDefaultHttpClientOptions(), $options),
);
$cleanOptions = $this->cleanOptionsFromConfidentialData($options);
if ($options === $cleanOptions) {
return ($this->httpClientFactory)($options);
}
$scopedOptionsByRegex = [];
foreach ($this->getRootPageUriCollection()->all() as $rootPageUri) {
$scopedOptionsByRegex[preg_quote($this->getOriginFromUri($rootPageUri))] = $options;
}
return new ScopingHttpClient(($this->httpClientFactory)($cleanOptions), $scopedOptionsByRegex);
}
// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:226-247 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0
foreach ($options as $k => $v) {
if ('headers' === $k) {
foreach ($v as $header => $value) {
if (\in_array(strtolower($header), ['authorization', 'cookie'], true)) {
continue;
}
$cleanOptions['headers'][$header] = $value;
}
continue;
}
if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) {
continue;
}
$cleanOptions[$k] = $v;
}
Symfony HttpClient authentication options are auth_basic and auth_bearer; Contao's own manual documents auth_basic for crawler Basic Authentication. Because the cleaner only strips basic_auth and bearer_auth, the "clean" default client for non-root-page hosts still carries the real auth options. The existing factory test intends to assert that Authorization is not sent to www.foreign-domain.com, but its mock client factory ignores the $defaultOptions argument, so it does not catch auth options that survive into HttpClient::create($cleanOptions).
Suggested Mitigation
Strip the actual Symfony HttpClient authentication option keys from the clean client. Include NTLM as a defensive extension because Symfony documents it as another auth option.
- if ('basic_auth' === $k || 'bearer_auth' === $k) {
+ if (\in_array($k, ['auth_basic', 'auth_bearer', 'auth_ntlm', 'basic_auth', 'bearer_auth'], true)) {
continue;
}
Also update the factory test so the mock factory records or preserves $defaultOptions; otherwise the test does not verify what HttpClient::create($cleanOptions) receives in production.
Impact
- Direct primitive: disclosure of crawler Basic/Bearer credentials to an external host reached by the crawler.
- Chain potential: if those credentials protect a staging or pre-publication environment, an attacker can use them to access that environment. The impact depends on what the leaked credential unlocks.
- Realistic exploitation: a content editor adds a link to
https://attacker.example/probeon a page that the crawler visits. When an administrator or scheduled maintenance run starts the broken-link checker with crawler Basic/Bearer authentication configured, the request to the attacker URL includes the generatedAuthorizationheader.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/contao"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/contao"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/core-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "contao/core-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55824"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T19:43:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T19:17:11Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nContao\u0027s crawler tries to prevent confidential HTTP client options from being sent to external domains by creating a scoped client: full options for root page origins, cleaned options for everything else. The cleaner removes `Cookie` and `Authorization` headers, but it removes the non-Symfony option names `basic_auth` and `bearer_auth` instead of Symfony HttpClient\u0027s real `auth_basic` and `auth_bearer` options.\n\nWhen `contao.crawl.default_http_client_options` contains Basic or Bearer authentication for a protected staging/production site, those credentials remain in the \"clean\" client used for external links or configured additional URIs. An attacker who can get an external URL crawled, for example through a link on a crawled page while the broken-link checker is enabled, can receive the crawler credentials.\n\n## Technical Detail\n\n### Root Cause\n\n```php\n// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:175-209 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0\nprivate function createHttpClient(array $options = []): HttpClientInterface\n{\n $options = array_merge_recursive(\n [\n \u0027headers\u0027 =\u003e [\n \u0027accept\u0027 =\u003e \u0027text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\u0027,\n \u0027user-agent\u0027 =\u003e self::USER_AGENT,\n ],\n \u0027max_duration\u0027 =\u003e 10,\n ],\n array_merge_recursive($this-\u003egetDefaultHttpClientOptions(), $options),\n );\n\n $cleanOptions = $this-\u003ecleanOptionsFromConfidentialData($options);\n\n if ($options === $cleanOptions) {\n return ($this-\u003ehttpClientFactory)($options);\n }\n\n $scopedOptionsByRegex = [];\n\n foreach ($this-\u003egetRootPageUriCollection()-\u003eall() as $rootPageUri) {\n $scopedOptionsByRegex[preg_quote($this-\u003egetOriginFromUri($rootPageUri))] = $options;\n }\n\n return new ScopingHttpClient(($this-\u003ehttpClientFactory)($cleanOptions), $scopedOptionsByRegex);\n}\n```\n\n```php\n// core-bundle/src/Crawl/Escargot/Factory.php:226-247 @ e550b92a01ef625bd546e6c3956dd200af05ebf0\nforeach ($options as $k =\u003e $v) {\n if (\u0027headers\u0027 === $k) {\n foreach ($v as $header =\u003e $value) {\n if (\\in_array(strtolower($header), [\u0027authorization\u0027, \u0027cookie\u0027], true)) {\n continue;\n }\n\n $cleanOptions[\u0027headers\u0027][$header] = $value;\n }\n\n continue;\n }\n\n if (\u0027basic_auth\u0027 === $k || \u0027bearer_auth\u0027 === $k) {\n continue;\n }\n\n $cleanOptions[$k] = $v;\n}\n```\n\nSymfony HttpClient authentication options are `auth_basic` and `auth_bearer`; Contao\u0027s own manual documents `auth_basic` for crawler Basic Authentication. Because the cleaner only strips `basic_auth` and `bearer_auth`, the \"clean\" default client for non-root-page hosts still carries the real auth options. The existing factory test intends to assert that `Authorization` is not sent to `www.foreign-domain.com`, but its mock client factory ignores the `$defaultOptions` argument, so it does not catch auth options that survive into `HttpClient::create($cleanOptions)`.\n\n\n## Suggested Mitigation\n\nStrip the actual Symfony HttpClient authentication option keys from the clean client. Include NTLM as a defensive extension because Symfony documents it as another auth option.\n\n```diff\n- if (\u0027basic_auth\u0027 === $k || \u0027bearer_auth\u0027 === $k) {\n+ if (\\in_array($k, [\u0027auth_basic\u0027, \u0027auth_bearer\u0027, \u0027auth_ntlm\u0027, \u0027basic_auth\u0027, \u0027bearer_auth\u0027], true)) {\n continue;\n }\n```\n\nAlso update the factory test so the mock factory records or preserves `$defaultOptions`; otherwise the test does not verify what `HttpClient::create($cleanOptions)` receives in production.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Direct primitive**: disclosure of crawler Basic/Bearer credentials to an external host reached by the crawler.\n- **Chain potential**: if those credentials protect a staging or pre-publication environment, an attacker can use them to access that environment. The impact depends on what the leaked credential unlocks.\n- **Realistic exploitation**: a content editor adds a link to `https://attacker.example/probe` on a page that the crawler visits. When an administrator or scheduled maintenance run starts the broken-link checker with crawler Basic/Bearer authentication configured, the request to the attacker URL includes the generated `Authorization` header.",
"id": "GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6",
"modified": "2026-08-06T19:43:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T19:43:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/security/advisories/GHSA-3mr9-p497-58f6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55824"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/commit/5bc6e3f900c439313df57aa561d0865792aafa05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/commit/80425d28cdf66280a209bd3f5bc31b1a76901a04"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://contao.org/en/security-advisories/credentials-disclosure-in-the-crawler"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/contao/contao/CVE-2026-55824.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/contao/core-bundle/CVE-2026-55824.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/contao/contao"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Contao crawler leaks auth credentials to external hosts"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.