GHSA-3JF9-7QHV-4PM6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths
nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported:
WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at: nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv] but there are no more locks to release! no locks held by exploit/193.
Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the common unlock label for the post-lock paths only.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68179"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-675"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmisc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths\n\nnsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial\ncopy_from_user() fails before nsm-\u003elock has been taken. The error path\nthen blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired.\n\nThis issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually\nreviewed against the current tree.\n\nThe grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock\ncopy_from_user(\u0026raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing\nNSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the\nshared out label before mutex_lock(\u0026nsm-\u003elock). Lockdep reported:\n\n WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!\n exploit/193 is trying to release lock (\u0026global_nsm.lock) at:\n nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv]\n but there are no more locks to release!\n no locks held by exploit/193.\n\nReturn immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the\ncommon unlock label for the post-lock paths only.",
"id": "GHSA-3jf9-7qhv-4pm6",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aa3f7d48e91eb74a363c1b4d7dbdd28f5b341fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f068342096b027181b168d91fef7ac7a2c64b25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce1fed11d18e163baf7f875152a33bf80f625c1a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f318f5a872cb9096536e759b23ae5c9873bb80ed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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