GHSA-3G7J-4HJ7-8RGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: always drain cache_cleaner before destroying a cache_detail
sunrpc_destroy_cache_detail() only cancels the global cache_cleaner delayed_work when cache_list is empty. During per-netns teardown cache_list is never empty because init_net's caches remain registered, so the cancel never fires. After unlink, the caller proceeds to cache_destroy_net() which kfrees the cache_detail while cache_clean() may still hold a dangling pointer to it. The result is a use-after-free: cache_dequeue() takes cd->queue_lock on freed memory, and cache_put() dereferences cd->cache_put as a function pointer from freed slab.
Drop the list_empty guard so that cancel_delayed_work_sync() always runs, ensuring any in-flight cache_clean() completes before the cache_detail is freed. Re-arm the cleaner afterwards if other caches are still registered.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89548"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: always drain cache_cleaner before destroying a cache_detail\n\nsunrpc_destroy_cache_detail() only cancels the global cache_cleaner\ndelayed_work when cache_list is empty. During per-netns teardown\ncache_list is never empty because init_net\u0027s caches remain registered,\nso the cancel never fires. After unlink, the caller proceeds to\ncache_destroy_net() which kfrees the cache_detail while cache_clean()\nmay still hold a dangling pointer to it. The result is a\nuse-after-free: cache_dequeue() takes cd-\u003equeue_lock on freed memory,\nand cache_put() dereferences cd-\u003ecache_put as a function pointer from\nfreed slab.\n\nDrop the list_empty guard so that cancel_delayed_work_sync() always\nruns, ensuring any in-flight cache_clean() completes before the\ncache_detail is freed. Re-arm the cleaner afterwards if other caches\nare still registered.",
"id": "GHSA-3g7j-4hj7-8rgc",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e861ce2aaa468351a6a47c4cbb4971ebb740c7b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d60fdf951143d6ef4e352e2f8eb852286701726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5eea874a696201c31e7c2d7badbfa0d90e9961b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d74ecc2be120a0c300b224b7649fe93c0453714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d44836f60c8c29bcdb1471fd9202387c642a890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf239de7fdcc8336259b01ea4bcf650dadad1040"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dec787a15c96a5665e9ffc61b429a6a4ab26e6b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f42d0fda0c67695db6bc704b04b7c10240805377"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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