GHSA-3F48-8RF6-XMCQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-09 03:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

PCI: Fix dropping valid root bus resources with .end = zero

On r8a7791/koelsch:

kmemleak: 1 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak) # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak unreferenced object 0xc3a34e00 (size 64): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294937460 (age 199.080s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): b4 5d 81 f0 b4 5d 81 f0 c0 b0 a2 c3 00 00 00 00 .]...].......... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [] __kmalloc+0xf0/0x140 [<34bd6bc0>] resource_list_create_entry+0x18/0x38 [<767046bc>] pci_add_resource_offset+0x20/0x68 [] devm_of_pci_get_host_bridge_resources.constprop.0+0xb0/0x390

When coalescing two resources for a contiguous aperture, the second resource is enlarged to cover the full contiguous range, while the first resource is marked invalid. This invalidation is done by clearing the flags, start, and end members.

When adding the initial resources to the bus later, invalid resources are skipped. Unfortunately, the check for an invalid resource considers only the end member, causing false positives.

E.g. on r8a7791/koelsch, root bus resource 0 ("bus 00") is skipped, and no longer registered with pci_bus_insert_busn_res() (causing the memory leak), nor printed:

pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: host bridge /soc/pci@ee090000 ranges: pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: MEM 0x00ee080000..0x00ee08ffff -> 0x00ee080000 pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: PCI: revision 11 pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00 -pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [bus 00] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0xee080000-0xee08ffff]

Fix this by only skipping resources where all of the flags, start, and end members are zero.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-53814"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T01:16:53Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI: Fix dropping valid root bus resources with .end = zero\n\nOn r8a7791/koelsch:\n\n  kmemleak: 1 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)\n  # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak\n  unreferenced object 0xc3a34e00 (size 64):\n    comm \"swapper/0\", pid 1, jiffies 4294937460 (age 199.080s)\n    hex dump (first 32 bytes):\n      b4 5d 81 f0 b4 5d 81 f0 c0 b0 a2 c3 00 00 00 00  .]...]..........\n      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................\n    backtrace:\n      [\u003cfe3aa979\u003e] __kmalloc+0xf0/0x140\n      [\u003c34bd6bc0\u003e] resource_list_create_entry+0x18/0x38\n      [\u003c767046bc\u003e] pci_add_resource_offset+0x20/0x68\n      [\u003cb3f3edf2\u003e] devm_of_pci_get_host_bridge_resources.constprop.0+0xb0/0x390\n\nWhen coalescing two resources for a contiguous aperture, the second\nresource is enlarged to cover the full contiguous range, while the first\nresource is marked invalid.  This invalidation is done by clearing the\nflags, start, and end members.\n\nWhen adding the initial resources to the bus later, invalid resources are\nskipped.  Unfortunately, the check for an invalid resource considers only\nthe end member, causing false positives.\n\nE.g. on r8a7791/koelsch, root bus resource 0 (\"bus 00\") is skipped, and no\nlonger registered with pci_bus_insert_busn_res() (causing the memory leak),\nnor printed:\n\n   pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: host bridge /soc/pci@ee090000 ranges:\n   pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci:      MEM 0x00ee080000..0x00ee08ffff -\u003e 0x00ee080000\n   pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: PCI: revision 11\n   pci-rcar-gen2 ee090000.pci: PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00\n  -pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [bus 00]\n   pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [mem 0xee080000-0xee08ffff]\n\nFix this by only skipping resources where all of the flags, start, and end\nmembers are zero.",
  "id": "GHSA-3f48-8rf6-xmcq",
  "modified": "2025-12-09T03:31:11Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T03:31:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e6f2714d93cdf977b6124a80af2cf0e14e2d407"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d8ba74a181b1c81def21168795ed96cbe6f05ed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4af080f3ef6a65b0d702988c2471a47c9ae2cc0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe6a1fbe83f5b23d7db93596b793561230f06b40"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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