GHSA-3CW6-2J68-868P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:16 – Updated: 2026-03-11 20:42Summary
Calling Utility::getAddressWithPort with a scoped IPv6 addresses causes a crash. This utility is called in the data plane from the original_src filter and the dns filter.
Details
The crashing function is Utility::getAddressWithPort. The crash occurs if a string containing a scoped IPv6 address is passed to this function.
This vulnerability affects:
- The original src filter: If the filter is configured and the original source is a scoped IPv6 address, it will cause a crash.
- DNS response address resolution: If a DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address, this will also trigger the crash.
PoC
To reproduce the vulnerability:
- Method A (Original Src Filter): Configure the
original srcfilter in Envoy and provide a scoped IPv6 address as the original source. - Method B (DNS Resolution): Trigger a DNS resolution process within Envoy where the DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address.
Impact
This is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. It impacts users who have the original src filter configured or whose Envoy instances resolve addresses from DNS responses that may contain scoped IPv6 addresses.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"versions": [
"1.37.0"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.36.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.36.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.35.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.35.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.34.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26310"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:16:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T20:16:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nCalling `Utility::getAddressWithPort` with a scoped IPv6 addresses causes a crash. This utility is called in the data plane from the original_src filter and the dns filter.\n\n### Details\n\nThe crashing function is `Utility::getAddressWithPort`. The crash occurs if a string containing a scoped IPv6 address is passed to this function.\n\nThis vulnerability affects:\n\n1. The **original src filter**: If the filter is configured and the original source is a scoped IPv6 address, it will cause a crash.\n2. **DNS response address resolution**: If a DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address, this will also trigger the crash.\n\n### PoC\n\nTo reproduce the vulnerability:\n\n1. **Method A (Original Src Filter):** Configure the `original src` filter in Envoy and provide a scoped IPv6 address as the original source.\n2. **Method B (DNS Resolution):** Trigger a DNS resolution process within Envoy where the DNS response contains a scoped IPv6 address.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. It impacts users who have the `original src` filter configured or whose Envoy instances resolve addresses from DNS responses that may contain scoped IPv6 addresses.",
"id": "GHSA-3cw6-2j68-868p",
"modified": "2026-03-11T20:42:23Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T18:16:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-3cw6-2j68-868p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26310"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Envoy vulnerable to crash for scoped ip address during DNS"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.