GHSA-39C2-8Q4F-X463

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 21:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 21:31
VLAI
Details

In Splunk Enterprise Security versions below 8.7.0, a user who holds the "ess_user" Splunk Enterprise Security role could store attacker-controlled asset data in an asset source lookup. A user that holds a role with the mc_assets_read capability could later open the Asset Center dashboard and select that value in the Asset Information table. Splunk Enterprise Security could then run attacker-controlled Search Processing Language (SPL) commands using the permissions of that user. With this access, the user who stored the asset data could expose or modify data available to the user who selected the value. The vulnerability is possible because Asset Center does not escape asset values before adding them to drilldown searches. The vulnerability requires Asset Center to process the asset data and another user to select the value. The user who stored the data should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will. For more information see Users and roles for Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/install/8.7/installation/users-and-roles-for-splunk-enterprise-security), Add asset and identity data to Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/administer/8.7/asset-and-identity-management/add-asset-and-identity-data-to-splunk-enterprise-security), and Asset and identity dashboards (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/user-guide/8.7/analytics/asset-and-identity-dashboards) in the Splunk documentation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-131205"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-943"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T20:17:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Splunk Enterprise Security versions below 8.7.0, a user who holds the \"ess_user\" Splunk Enterprise Security role could store attacker-controlled asset data in an asset source lookup. A user that holds a role with the mc_assets_read capability could later open the Asset Center dashboard and select that value in the Asset Information table. Splunk Enterprise Security could then run attacker-controlled Search Processing Language (SPL) commands using the permissions of that user. With this access, the user who stored the asset data could expose or modify data available to the user who selected the value.\nThe vulnerability is possible because Asset Center does not escape asset values before adding them to drilldown searches.\nThe vulnerability requires Asset Center to process the asset data and another user to select the value. The user who stored the data should not be able to exploit the vulnerability at will.\nFor more information see Users and roles for Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/install/8.7/installation/users-and-roles-for-splunk-enterprise-security), Add asset and identity data to Splunk Enterprise Security (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/administer/8.7/asset-and-identity-management/add-asset-and-identity-data-to-splunk-enterprise-security), and Asset and identity dashboards (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/user-guide/8.7/analytics/asset-and-identity-dashboards) in the Splunk documentation.",
  "id": "GHSA-39c2-8q4f-x463",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T21:31:50Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T21:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-131205"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2026-1106"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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