GHSA-36XV-JGW5-4Q75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-06 17:59 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:46Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
SseStream._transform() interpolates message.type and message.id directly into Server-Sent Events text protocol output without sanitizing newline characters (\r, \n). Since the SSE protocol treats both \r and \n as field delimiters and \n\n as event boundaries, an attacker who can influence these fields through upstream data sources can inject arbitrary SSE events, spoof event types, and corrupt reconnection state. Spring Framework's own security patch (6e97587) validates these same fields (id, event) for the same reason.
Actual impact:
- Event spoofing: Attacker forges SSE events with arbitrary
event:types, causing client-sideEventSource.addEventListener()callbacks to fire for wrong event types. - Data injection: Attacker injects arbitrary
data:payloads, potentially triggering XSS if the client renders SSE data as HTML without sanitization. - Reconnection corruption: Attacker injects
id:fields, corrupting theLast-Event-IDheader on reconnection, causing the client to miss or replay events. -
Attack precondition: Requires the developer to map user-influenced data to the
typeoridfields of SSE messages. Direct HTTP request input does not reach these fields without developer code bridging the gap.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Patched in @nestjs/core@11.1.18
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.1.17"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nestjs/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.1.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35515"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T17:59:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T16:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\n[`SseStream._transform()`](https://github.com/nestjs/nest/blob/dea5279ef8fcb568de158003e4281759a2cd7675/packages/core/router/sse-stream.ts) interpolates `message.type` and `message.id` directly into Server-Sent Events text protocol output without sanitizing newline characters (`\\r`, `\\n`). Since the SSE protocol treats both `\\r` and `\\n` as field delimiters and `\\n\\n` as event boundaries, an attacker who can influence these fields through upstream data sources can inject arbitrary SSE events, spoof event types, and corrupt reconnection state. Spring Framework\u0027s own security patch ([6e97587](https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/commit/6e9758700a4946be1dca85ca937ef2603e291301)) validates these same fields (`id`, `event`) for the same reason.\n\nActual impact:\n\n- **Event spoofing**: Attacker forges SSE events with arbitrary `event:` types, causing client-side `EventSource.addEventListener()` callbacks to fire for wrong event types.\n- **Data injection**: Attacker injects arbitrary `data:` payloads, potentially triggering XSS if the client renders SSE data as HTML without sanitization.\n- **Reconnection corruption**: Attacker injects `id:` fields, corrupting the `Last-Event-ID` header on reconnection, causing the client to miss or replay events.\n- **Attack precondition**: Requires the developer to map user-influenced data to the `type` or `id` fields of SSE messages. Direct HTTP request input does not reach these fields without developer code bridging the gap.\n-\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nPatched in `@nestjs/core@11.1.18`",
"id": "GHSA-36xv-jgw5-4q75",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:46:22Z",
"published": "2026-04-06T17:59:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nestjs/nest/security/advisories/GHSA-36xv-jgw5-4q75"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35515"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nestjs/nest/pull/16686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nestjs/nest/commit/83558ae774a990a7916141d3abe0b6548ff3a8b2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nestjs/nest"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nestjs/nest/releases/tag/v11.1.18"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@nestjs/core Improperly Neutralizes Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (\u0027Injection\u0027)"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.