GHSA-36F2-FCRX-FP4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-16 16:04 – Updated: 2023-03-16 16:04Impact
Utilizing a HTTP query parameter an attacker is able to redirect users from the web application to any domain. The URL of the intended redirect should always be checked for safety prior to forwarding the user. Other endpoints of the web application already do this, they check both that the domain is using the HTTPS protocol and that it exists on a domain associated with the application.
An attacker is able to use this unintended functionality to redirect users to malicious sites. This particular security issue allows the attacker to make a phishing attempt seem much more trustworthy to a user of the web application as the initial site before redirection is familiar to them, as well as the actual URL which they have theoretically visited frequently.
While this security issue does not directly impact the security of the web application, it is still not an acceptable scenario for the reasons mentioned above.
Patches
f0cb75e1e102f95f91e9254c66c797e821857690 fix(handlers): logout redirection validation (#1908) v4.28.0
Workarounds
Using a reverse proxy to strip the query parameter from the affected endpoint.
References
https://github.com/authelia/authelia/pull/1908
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact us. You may also contact us to request creating a back-ported fix for this if you are able to explain why you cannot upgrade; however upgrading is highly preferable.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/authelia/authelia/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.28.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-29456"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-16T16:04:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-21T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nUtilizing a HTTP query parameter an attacker is able to redirect users from the web application to any domain. The URL of the intended redirect should always be checked for safety prior to forwarding the user. Other endpoints of the web application already do this, they check both that the domain is using the HTTPS protocol and that it exists on a domain associated with the application.\n\nAn attacker is able to use this unintended functionality to redirect users to malicious sites. This particular security issue allows the attacker to make a phishing attempt seem much more trustworthy to a user of the web application as the initial site before redirection is familiar to them, as well as the actual URL which they have theoretically visited frequently. \n\nWhile this security issue does not directly impact the security of the web application, it is still not an acceptable scenario for the reasons mentioned above. \n\n### Patches\nf0cb75e1e102f95f91e9254c66c797e821857690 fix(handlers): logout redirection validation (#1908) [v4.28.0](https://github.com/authelia/authelia/releases/tag/v4.28.0)\n\n### Workarounds\nUsing a reverse proxy to strip the query parameter from the affected endpoint. \n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/authelia/authelia/pull/1908\n\n[CWE-601](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html)\n\n[Authelia v4.28.0](https://github.com/authelia/authelia/tree/v4.28.0)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [contact us](https://github.com/authelia/authelia#contact-options). You may also contact us to request creating a back-ported fix for this if you are able to explain why you cannot upgrade; however upgrading is highly preferable. ",
"id": "GHSA-36f2-fcrx-fp4j",
"modified": "2023-03-16T16:04:56Z",
"published": "2023-03-16T16:04:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/authelia/authelia/security/advisories/GHSA-36f2-fcrx-fp4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29456"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/authelia/authelia"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Authelia allows open redirects on the logout endpoint"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.