GHSA-356C-WQMF-CF5H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/msm: don't tear down KMS twice when KMS init fails

When priv->kms_init() (mdp4_kms_init() / mdp5_kms_init()) fails partway through, both display drivers already tear their KMS state down via mdp4_destroy() / mdp5_kms_destroy() before returning the error. The common error path in msm_drm_init() then runs msm_drm_uninit() -> msm_drm_kms_uninit(), which tries to destroy the very same KMS a second time, which causes a use-after-free crash.

Bring MDP4/MDP5 in line with the DPU driver whose dpu_kms_init() doesn't perform error cleanup on the failure. Let the common path own the cleanup, instead of freeing the KMS from their error paths.

The crash trace for the reference:

__lock_acquire from lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5906 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5863) lock_acquire from touch_wq_lockdep_map (kernel/workqueue.c:4094 (discriminator 1)) touch_wq_lockdep_map from __flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:4136) __flush_workqueue from msm_drm_kms_uninit (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_kms.c:243 (discriminator 33)) msm_drm_kms_uninit from msm_drm_uninit (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c:93) msm_drm_uninit from msm_drm_init (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c:184) msm_drm_init from try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device (drivers/base/component.c:249 drivers/base/component.c:227) try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device from __component_add (drivers/base/component.c:269 drivers/base/component.c:748) __component_add from dsi_host_attach (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c:1739) dsi_host_attach from mipi_dsi_attach (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mipi_dsi.c:383) mipi_dsi_attach from sharp_nt_panel_probe (drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-sharp-ls043t1le01.c:247)

Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/742068/

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90363"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:35Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/msm: don\u0027t tear down KMS twice when KMS init fails\n\nWhen priv-\u003ekms_init() (mdp4_kms_init() / mdp5_kms_init()) fails partway\nthrough, both display drivers already tear their KMS state down via\nmdp4_destroy() / mdp5_kms_destroy() before returning the error. The\ncommon error path in msm_drm_init() then runs msm_drm_uninit() -\u003e\nmsm_drm_kms_uninit(), which tries to destroy the very same KMS a second\ntime, which causes a use-after-free crash.\n\nBring MDP4/MDP5 in line with the DPU driver whose dpu_kms_init() doesn\u0027t\nperform error cleanup on the failure. Let the common path own the\ncleanup, instead of freeing the KMS from their error paths.\n\nThe crash trace for the reference:\n\n  __lock_acquire from lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5906 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5863)\n  lock_acquire from touch_wq_lockdep_map (kernel/workqueue.c:4094 (discriminator 1))\n  touch_wq_lockdep_map from __flush_workqueue (kernel/workqueue.c:4136)\n  __flush_workqueue from msm_drm_kms_uninit (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_kms.c:243 (discriminator 33))\n  msm_drm_kms_uninit from msm_drm_uninit (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c:93)\n  msm_drm_uninit from msm_drm_init (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c:184)\n  msm_drm_init from try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device (drivers/base/component.c:249 drivers/base/component.c:227)\n  try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device from __component_add (drivers/base/component.c:269 drivers/base/component.c:748)\n  __component_add from dsi_host_attach (drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c:1739)\n  dsi_host_attach from mipi_dsi_attach (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mipi_dsi.c:383)\n  mipi_dsi_attach from sharp_nt_panel_probe (drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-sharp-ls043t1le01.c:247)\n\nPatchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/742068/",
  "id": "GHSA-356c-wqmf-cf5h",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:25Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90363"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08827aa40f0ee9d37dcff8d6acb340b970051486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54437ace956dc7b758c0219d6f76654b3ead8d69"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93c125e4ea98fb25f927ba5a334d85845127d667"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2a99fa93b400dfbb9598103249f71969501094a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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