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GHSA-3544-2M6J-7M5R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix busy dentry warning on unmount after DIO

Commit c68337442f03 ("cifs: Fix busy dentry used after unmounting") fixed the issue in cifs where deferred close of a file led to a dentry reference count not being released in umount, by flushing deferredclose_wq in cifs_kill_sb() to solve it.

However, the cifs DIO path suffers from the same busy-dentry problem caused by a delayed dentry reference-count release:

[dio]           [cifsd]         [close + umount]

netfs_unbuffered_write_iter_locked ... cifs_demultiplex_thread netfs_unbuffered_write cifs_issue_write netfs_wait_for_in_progress_stream [1] ... netfs_write_subrequest_terminated netfs_subreq_clear_in_progress netfs_wake_collector // wake [1] netfs_put_subrequest netfs_put_request queue_work(system_dfl_wq, xxx) [2] // dio write return cifs_close _cifsFileInfo_put // cfile->count 2->1 --cfile->count [3]

                        // umount
                        cifs_kill_sb
                         kill_anon_super
                          // warning triggered!
                          shrink_dcache_for_umount [4]

[system_dfl_wq] [5] netfs_free_request ... _cifsFileInfo_put // cfile->count 1->0 --cfile->count queue_work(fileinfo_put_wq, xxx)

[fileinfo_put_wq] [6] cifsFileInfo_put_work cifsFileInfo_put_final dput

If the umount path is triggered before [5], it results warning: BUG: Dentry 00000000eab1f070{i=9a917b66ae404fec,n=test} still in use (1) [unmount of cifs cifs]

The existing per-inode ictx->io_count wait in cifs_evict_inode() does not help: it lives in the inode eviction path, which runs after shrink_dcache_for_umount() has already warned about the busy dentries.

Fix it by adding a per-superblock outstanding-rreq counter that is incremented in cifs_init_request() and decremented in cifs_free_request(). In cifs_kill_sb(), before kill_anon_super(), wait for this counter to reach 0 - which guarantees that all cleanup_work for this sb have run and thus all relevant cfile puts are queued on fileinfo_put_wq or serverclose_wq. Then drain the workqueue so the dentry refs are dropped.

This is a targeted wait, not a flush of the system-wide system_dfl_wq.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix busy dentry warning on unmount after DIO\n\nCommit c68337442f03 (\"cifs: Fix busy dentry used after unmounting\") fixed\nthe issue in cifs where deferred close of a file led to a dentry reference\ncount not being released in umount, by flushing deferredclose_wq in\ncifs_kill_sb() to solve it.\n\nHowever, the cifs DIO path suffers from the same busy-dentry problem caused\nby a delayed dentry reference-count release:\n\n\t[dio]\t\t\t[cifsd]\t\t\t[close + umount]\nnetfs_unbuffered_write_iter_locked\n...\n\t\t\t\tcifs_demultiplex_thread\n netfs_unbuffered_write\n  cifs_issue_write\n  netfs_wait_for_in_progress_stream [1]\n\t\t\t\t...\n\t\t\t\t netfs_write_subrequest_terminated\n\t\t\t\t  netfs_subreq_clear_in_progress\n\t\t\t\t   netfs_wake_collector // wake [1]\n\t\t\t\t  netfs_put_subrequest\n netfs_put_request\n  queue_work(system_dfl_wq, xxx) [2]\n // dio write return\t\t\t\t\tcifs_close\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t _cifsFileInfo_put\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  // cfile-\u003ecount 2-\u003e1\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  --cfile-\u003ecount [3]\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// umount\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcifs_kill_sb\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t kill_anon_super\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  // warning triggered!\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  shrink_dcache_for_umount [4]\n[system_dfl_wq] [5]\nnetfs_free_request\n ...\n _cifsFileInfo_put\n  // cfile-\u003ecount 1-\u003e0\n  --cfile-\u003ecount\n  queue_work(fileinfo_put_wq, xxx)\n\n[fileinfo_put_wq] [6]\ncifsFileInfo_put_work\n cifsFileInfo_put_final\n  dput\n\nIf the umount path is triggered before [5], it results warning:\nBUG: Dentry 00000000eab1f070{i=9a917b66ae404fec,n=test}  still in use (1)\n[unmount of cifs cifs]\n\nThe existing per-inode ictx-\u003eio_count wait in cifs_evict_inode() does not\nhelp: it lives in the inode eviction path, which runs after\nshrink_dcache_for_umount() has already warned about the busy dentries.\n\nFix it by adding a per-superblock outstanding-rreq counter that is\nincremented in cifs_init_request() and decremented in cifs_free_request().\nIn cifs_kill_sb(), before kill_anon_super(), wait for this counter to reach\n0 - which guarantees that all cleanup_work for this sb have run and thus\nall relevant cfile puts are queued on fileinfo_put_wq or serverclose_wq.\nThen drain the workqueue so the dentry refs are dropped.\n\nThis is a targeted wait, not a flush of the system-wide system_dfl_wq.",
  "id": "GHSA-3544-2m6j-7m5r",
  "modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:23Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:32:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72315"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75f5c412fa867efa0bf9b646bffe0d912109e84a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0eac9c3c3711f24efc2aaf12b8ec3e54a38c214"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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