GHSA-3537-P4VP-G252
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg
Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects, per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without __GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain unaccounted.
Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to: - the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to every filter of every classifier (32 pointers, 256 bytes); - the filter-object, per-CPU-counter, and per-filter aux allocations in cls_basic, cls_bpf, cls_cgroup, cls_flow, cls_flower, cls_fw, cls_matchall, cls_route and cls_u32; - the u32_init_knode() replace-path knode allocation (cls_u32.c), which allocates the same struct tc_u_knode + sel.keys on every replace of an existing knode and was missed by the create-path-only conversion.
Also fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the IDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the errout path kfree'd fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer in the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable on demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable and burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu failure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern.
Note: vega@nebusec.ai provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to extend to the other classifiers.
Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_CLS_* (the classifier being used), CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, CONFIG_MEMCG, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS. - Unprivileged user in a fresh user+network namespace (unshare -Urn), or root with CAP_NET_ADMIN. - Create a large number of tc filters (e.g. tc filter add dev lo ingress ... ...) while watching a memcg-limited cgroup: system slab grows far faster than memory.current, pinning kernel memory outside memcg charging.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90099"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:01Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg\n\nAllocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects,\nper-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without\n__GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside\nmemcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in\ncls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the\nper-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain\nunaccounted.\n\nAdd GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to:\n- the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to every\n filter of every classifier (32 pointers, 256 bytes);\n- the filter-object, per-CPU-counter, and per-filter aux allocations in\n cls_basic, cls_bpf, cls_cgroup, cls_flow, cls_flower, cls_fw,\n cls_matchall, cls_route and cls_u32;\n- the u32_init_knode() replace-path knode allocation (cls_u32.c), which\n allocates the same struct tc_u_knode + sel.keys on every replace of an\n existing knode and was missed by the create-path-only conversion.\n\nAlso fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the\nIDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the\nerrout path kfree\u0027d fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer\nin the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable\non demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable\nand burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu\nfailure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern.\n\nNote: vega@nebusec.ai provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to\nextend to the other classifiers.\n\nConditions to recreate the bug:\n- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_CLS_* (the classifier being used),\n CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, CONFIG_MEMCG, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS.\n- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+network namespace (unshare -Urn),\n or root with CAP_NET_ADMIN.\n- Create a large number of tc filters (e.g. tc filter add dev lo\n ingress ... \u003cclassifier\u003e ...) while watching a memcg-limited cgroup:\n system slab grows far faster than memory.current, pinning kernel\n memory outside memcg charging.",
"id": "GHSA-3537-p4vp-g252",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90099"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18c68c8f3d3ff0a4def1391021b439c4333a6c71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1beb81947eb486716af80db7a584f9e9fef7e003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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