GHSA-2XHX-G2J2-V5CP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject load-acquire from pointers requiring fault protection
A BPF_LOAD_ACQ is not rewritten to a BPF_PROBE_MEM load by the verifier, unlike a regular BPF_LDX, so the JIT emits a plain load with no exception table entry and a fault panics the kernel instead of being handled.
Reject the source pointer types that a BPF_LDX would have had that fault protection applied to, i.e. the ones bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() turns into BPF_PROBE_MEM: a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED.
This is reachable e.g. by loading ->mm out of a trusted task_struct yields an untrusted pointer to mm_struct, and it is NULL for a kernel thread:
[...] SEC("tp_btf/sched_switch") int BPF_PROG(demo, bool preempt, struct task_struct prev, struct task_struct next) { struct mm_struct mm = next->mm; / untrusted */
out_ldx = (__u64)mm->pgd; /* BPF_LDX */
out_acq = load_acquire(&mm->pgd); /* BPF_LOAD_ACQ */
return 0;
} [...]
Both dereference the same pointer, but only the BPF_LDX is protected (x86-64 JIT, jump targets shown prog-relative):
[...] ; out_ldx = (__u64)mm->pgd; 17: movq $-10485760, %r10 1e: movq %rsi, %r11 21: addq $184, %r11 28: subq %r10, %r11 2b: movabsq $140737498841088, %r10 35: cmpq %r10, %r11 38: ja 0x3e <-- kernel addr? 3a: xorl %edi, %edi <-- no: dst = 0, skip the load 3c: jmp 0x45 3e: movq 184(%rsi), %rdi <-- yes: load + extable entry [...] ; load_acquire(&mm->pgd) 53: movq %rsi, %rdi 56: movq 184(%rdi), %rax <-- no check, no extable entry [...]
Note that BPF_PROBE_MEM is not visible in a bpftool xlated dump, as bpf_insn_prepare_dump() rewrites it back to BPF_MEM.
A PTR_TRUSTED pointer is deliberately not on the list. Such a load is not converted either, but it does not need to be, since the pointer is guaranteed live, so load-acquire from it stays allowed.
The check is gated on BPF_LOAD_ACQ so that atomic RMW and store-release error messages are unchanged; writes (RMW / store-release) to such pointers are already rejected elsewhere, so only load-acquire needs this.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90269"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject load-acquire from pointers requiring fault protection\n\nA BPF_LOAD_ACQ is not rewritten to a BPF_PROBE_MEM load by the verifier,\nunlike a regular BPF_LDX, so the JIT emits a plain load with no exception\ntable entry and a fault panics the kernel instead of being handled.\n\nReject the source pointer types that a BPF_LDX would have had that fault\nprotection applied to, i.e. the ones bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() turns\ninto BPF_PROBE_MEM: a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED,\nPTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY |\nPTR_UNTRUSTED.\n\nThis is reachable e.g. by loading -\u003emm out of a trusted task_struct\nyields an untrusted pointer to mm_struct, and it is NULL for a kernel\nthread:\n\n [...]\n SEC(\"tp_btf/sched_switch\")\n int BPF_PROG(demo, bool preempt, struct task_struct *prev,\n struct task_struct *next)\n {\n struct mm_struct *mm = next-\u003emm; /* untrusted */\n\n out_ldx = (__u64)mm-\u003epgd; /* BPF_LDX */\n out_acq = load_acquire(\u0026mm-\u003epgd); /* BPF_LOAD_ACQ */\n return 0;\n }\n [...]\n\nBoth dereference the same pointer, but only the BPF_LDX is protected\n(x86-64 JIT, jump targets shown prog-relative):\n\n [...]\n ; out_ldx = (__u64)mm-\u003epgd;\n 17: movq $-10485760, %r10\n 1e: movq %rsi, %r11\n 21: addq $184, %r11\n 28: subq %r10, %r11\n 2b: movabsq $140737498841088, %r10\n 35: cmpq %r10, %r11\n 38: ja 0x3e \u003c-- kernel addr?\n 3a: xorl %edi, %edi \u003c-- no: dst = 0, skip the load\n 3c: jmp 0x45\n 3e: movq 184(%rsi), %rdi \u003c-- yes: load + extable entry\n [...]\n ; load_acquire(\u0026mm-\u003epgd)\n 53:\tmovq %rsi, %rdi\n 56:\tmovq 184(%rdi), %rax \u003c-- no check, no extable entry\n [...]\n\nNote that BPF_PROBE_MEM is not visible in a bpftool xlated dump, as\nbpf_insn_prepare_dump() rewrites it back to BPF_MEM.\n\nA PTR_TRUSTED pointer is deliberately not on the list. Such a load is\nnot converted either, but it does not need to be, since the pointer is\nguaranteed live, so load-acquire from it stays allowed.\n\nThe check is gated on BPF_LOAD_ACQ so that atomic RMW and store-release\nerror messages are unchanged; writes (RMW / store-release) to such\npointers are already rejected elsewhere, so only load-acquire needs this.",
"id": "GHSA-2xhx-g2j2-v5cp",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:58Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f8ade6e9b7931fc9697394f1b2c4ae833f5ac18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7db0a00445f1a40bacfe9b747405c11cb5f10fc9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4c8de3bf48d3756ab0f910fe5cc4937d70efdcd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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