GHSA-2XG4-WC7M-F6PQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: make sure cache entry active before cache_show
The function c_show was called with protection from RCU. This only
ensures that cp will not be freed. Therefore, the reference count for
cp can drop to zero, which will trigger a refcount use-after-free
warning when cache_get is called. To resolve this issue, use
cache_get_rcu to ensure that cp remains active.
------------[ cut here ]------------ refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 822 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 822 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120
Call Trace: c_show+0x2fc/0x380 [sunrpc] seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770 seq_read+0x1e5/0x270 proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140 vfs_read+0x125/0x530 ksys_read+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T14:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: make sure cache entry active before cache_show\n\nThe function `c_show` was called with protection from RCU. This only\nensures that `cp` will not be freed. Therefore, the reference count for\n`cp` can drop to zero, which will trigger a refcount use-after-free\nwarning when `cache_get` is called. To resolve this issue, use\n`cache_get_rcu` to ensure that `cp` remains active.\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 822 at lib/refcount.c:25\nrefcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120\nCPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 822 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS\n1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xb1/0x120\n\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n c_show+0x2fc/0x380 [sunrpc]\n seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770\n seq_read+0x1e5/0x270\n proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140\n vfs_read+0x125/0x530\n ksys_read+0xc1/0x160\n do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e",
"id": "GHSA-2xg4-wc7m-f6pq",
"modified": "2025-11-03T21:31:47Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T15:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02999e135b013d85c6df738746e8e24699befee4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/068c0b50f3f700b94f78850834cd91ae3b34c2c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2862eee078a4d2d1f584e7f24fa50dddfa5f3471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acfaf37888e0f0732fb6a50ff093dce6d99994d0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7dac3af57e38b2054f990e573256d90bf887958"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d882e2b7fad3f5e5fac66184a347f408813f654a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9be26735d055c42543a4d047a769cc6d0fb1504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec305f303bf070b4f6896b7a76009f702956d402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/03/msg00002.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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