GHSA-2VGP-F9R9-4W6F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-08-25 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix skb length accounting after generic XDP frag adjustment
Generic XDP exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdp_buff. If an XDP program adjusts the fragment area, bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp() copies xdp_frags_size back to skb->data_len but leaves skb->len containing the old fragment contribution.
After a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual linear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skb_datagram_iter() copied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at struct skb_shared_info. The copied bytes included the affected skb's nr_frags, xdp_frags_size and a kernel pointer from skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0]. Real packet data was displaced by the same amount and truncated at the end.
Subtract the old data_len before replacing it and add the new data_len afterwards, keeping skb->len and skb->data_len synchronized.
A 60000-byte UDP datagram on a veth pair with MTU 64000 was shortened by 1024 bytes from its fragment area. Before the fix, all 10 runs produced corrupted payloads. After the fix, all 10 runs matched the expected payload exactly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74665"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T16:16:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: fix skb length accounting after generic XDP frag adjustment\n\nGeneric XDP exposes non-linear skb fragments through an xdp_buff. If an\nXDP program adjusts the fragment area, bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp() copies\nxdp_frags_size back to skb-\u003edata_len but leaves skb-\u003elen containing the\nold fragment contribution.\n\nAfter a fragment shrink, this makes skb_headlen() larger than the actual\nlinear area. In the reproduced UDP receive path, __skb_datagram_iter()\ncopied 1024 bytes past the actual linear tail to userspace, starting at\nstruct skb_shared_info. The copied bytes included the affected skb\u0027s\nnr_frags, xdp_frags_size and a kernel pointer from\nskb_shinfo(skb)-\u003efrags[0]. Real packet data was displaced by the same\namount and truncated at the end.\n\nSubtract the old data_len before replacing it and add the new data_len\nafterwards, keeping skb-\u003elen and skb-\u003edata_len synchronized.\n\nA 60000-byte UDP datagram on a veth pair with MTU 64000 was shortened by\n1024 bytes from its fragment area. Before the fix, all 10 runs produced\ncorrupted payloads. After the fix, all 10 runs matched the expected\npayload exactly.",
"id": "GHSA-2vgp-f9r9-4w6f",
"modified": "2026-08-25T06:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T18:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74665"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33f2b2eb33d666ecac68031e0f31424fb70528db"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f30f9c302cea1f2ebf97abe574c1826544223d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72468efcc089782fa047afddd10856b11a14ef5b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea1ccd6d1c6370868e3b032a3fc575b9c397f2e1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.