GHSA-2RJ4-34VW-Q254
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:34In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: free the sbi after a grace period
If the "nocase" mount option ntfs3 uses custom hash and dentry compare functions. Both access ntfs3 superblock private information in rcu pathwalk. ntfs_put_super() and ntfs3_kill_sb() drop the info without any rcu delay. A lookup that's still inside the filesystem when the last reference to the mount is dropped causes a UAF. With a pathwalk held up in ntfs_d_hash() while the last reference to the mount goes away:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010453c850 by task walker/99 Call Trace: ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940 ntfs_d_hash+0x22b/0x500 link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30 path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00 filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0 vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0 [...] Allocated by task 95: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560 ntfs_init_fs_context+0x2db/0x5a0 alloc_fs_context+0x52e/0xc70 [...] Freed by task 98: kfree+0x1db/0x5b0 deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0 cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130 task_work_run+0x131/0x250
The bug is currently masked by the grace period in namespace_unlock() for umount(2). Keep the necessary information until the filesystem private info is freed and free it with an rcu delay.
ntfs3_free_sbi() now runs from an rcu callback and drops the upcase table via ntfs_put_shared(). So switch s_shared_lock over to spin_lock_bh(). Otherwise the callback can deadlock against a task holding the lock on the same cpu.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99171"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:37Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs3: free the sbi after a grace period\n\nIf the \"nocase\" mount option ntfs3 uses custom hash and dentry compare\nfunctions. Both access ntfs3 superblock private information in rcu\npathwalk. ntfs_put_super() and ntfs3_kill_sb() drop the info without any\nrcu delay. A lookup that\u0027s still inside the filesystem when the last\nreference to the mount is dropped causes a UAF. With a pathwalk held up\nin ntfs_d_hash() while the last reference to the mount goes away:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940\n Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010453c850 by task walker/99\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x752/0x940\n ntfs_d_hash+0x22b/0x500\n link_path_walk+0x11ad/0x1d30\n path_lookupat+0x63/0xb00\n filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0\n vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0\n [...]\n Allocated by task 95:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x249/0x560\n ntfs_init_fs_context+0x2db/0x5a0\n alloc_fs_context+0x52e/0xc70\n [...]\n Freed by task 98:\n kfree+0x1db/0x5b0\n deactivate_locked_super+0x9c/0xf0\n cleanup_mnt+0x9f/0x130\n task_work_run+0x131/0x250\n\nThe bug is currently masked by the grace period in namespace_unlock()\nfor umount(2). Keep the necessary information until the filesystem\nprivate info is freed and free it with an rcu delay.\n\nntfs3_free_sbi() now runs from an rcu callback and drops the upcase\ntable via ntfs_put_shared(). So switch s_shared_lock over to\nspin_lock_bh(). Otherwise the callback can deadlock against a task\nholding the lock on the same cpu.",
"id": "GHSA-2rj4-34vw-q254",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:34:24Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36e6753daf9bb64563dcb5a3bb22f7699d973fa2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7abecef26a9be8f9de70659a3092250461a52072"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c01b091b06412d3b1b53d8c2925f6de586c8a2fc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c39150784a801dbbfaf4fbfa284cb610552a5039"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8b1a4840467930e01f1a9374d991d7a8a2896c1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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