GHSA-2QJ8-CJV3-RXV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()
svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every point in the loop.
In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set, an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes, the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen SVID/VDO bytes.
Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner supplies or how the function was reached.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63962"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()\n\nsvdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata-\u003ealtmodes against the array size once\nbefore the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every\npoint in the loop.\n\nIn the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of\nat most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX\nmodes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the\nCMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming\nACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port-\u003epartner is set,\nan unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken\nor malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to\nALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra\nDiscover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes,\nthe loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For\nmode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the\npartner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen\nSVID/VDO bytes.\n\nMove the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed\npast ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner\nsupplies or how the function was reached.",
"id": "GHSA-2qj8-cjv3-rxv7",
"modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3389c149c68c3fea61910ad5d34f7bf3bff44e32"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4505f33dab56c274e82f47f94bf60a8cbf8f4b42"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/845598b154b9a92e9d279fafafa9405c121ae805"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbad85b446c06adbc5e5bed565871bb918ce9d32"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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