GHSA-2QCC-62M3-PG4C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: pfr_update: fix stack buffer overflow in query_capability()
query_capability() copies four ACPI buffer objects returned by the firmware _DSM into fixed-size u8[16] fields in struct pfru_update_cap_info using memcpy with the firmware-supplied length:
memcpy(&cap_hdr->code_type, elements[CAP_CODE_TYPE_IDX].buffer.pointer, elements[CAP_CODE_TYPE_IDX].buffer.length);
The same pattern repeats for drv_type, platform_id, and oem_id. If the firmware returns buffer.length > 16 for any of these fields, memcpy writes past the destination array.
struct pfru_update_cap_info is stack-allocated in pfru_ioctl().
Confirmed with KASAN on 7.2-rc6: three stack-out-of-bounds reports are generated when a DSM returns 64-byte buffers, with writes reaching 44 bytes past the end of cap_hdr's [64, 156) frame window into adjacent stack redzones.
Introduce a helper pointer to out_obj->package.elements and use it to validate each buffer length against its destination field size before copying, returning -EINVAL if the firmware supplies an oversized buffer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89587"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: pfr_update: fix stack buffer overflow in query_capability()\n\nquery_capability() copies four ACPI buffer objects returned by the\nfirmware _DSM into fixed-size u8[16] fields in struct\npfru_update_cap_info using memcpy with the firmware-supplied length:\n\n memcpy(\u0026cap_hdr-\u003ecode_type,\n elements[CAP_CODE_TYPE_IDX].buffer.pointer,\n elements[CAP_CODE_TYPE_IDX].buffer.length);\n\nThe same pattern repeats for drv_type, platform_id, and oem_id.\nIf the firmware returns buffer.length \u003e 16 for any of these fields,\nmemcpy writes past the destination array.\n\nstruct pfru_update_cap_info is stack-allocated in pfru_ioctl().\n\nConfirmed with KASAN on 7.2-rc6: three stack-out-of-bounds reports\nare generated when a DSM returns 64-byte buffers, with writes reaching\n44 bytes past the end of cap_hdr\u0027s [64, 156) frame window into\nadjacent stack redzones.\n\nIntroduce a helper pointer to out_obj-\u003epackage.elements and use it\nto validate each buffer length against its destination field size\nbefore copying, returning -EINVAL if the firmware supplies an\noversized buffer.",
"id": "GHSA-2qcc-62m3-pg4c",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15d2b7f38f95d28652170344f39ee492c55e567c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d4ed2fd022bc862b156e53aae163b61259e1caa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2151624b55029dad0ca7efd17fb83a0461c8843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5a31b4e7e37c92550be9a2edf51ca853a4d251a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ced45be0073a8a31b30b4a7f68cd3a15734515de"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3af83e327565a9444cebc0db714cb837e493046"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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