GHSA-2MVM-XGM9-R324
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-25 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:40In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: zero non-PI portion of auto integrity buffer
The auto-generated integrity buffer for writes needs to be fully initialized before being passed to the underlying block device, otherwise the uninitialized memory can be read back by userspace or anyone with physical access to the storage device. If protection information is generated, that portion of the integrity buffer is already initialized. The integrity data is also zeroed if PI generation is disabled via sysfs or the PI tuple size is 0. However, this misses the case where PI is generated and the PI tuple size is nonzero, but the metadata size is larger than the PI tuple. In this case, the remainder ("opaque") of the metadata is left uninitialized. Generalize the BLK_INTEGRITY_CSUM_NONE check to cover any case when the metadata is larger than just the PI tuple.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23007"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-908"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-25T15:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblock: zero non-PI portion of auto integrity buffer\n\nThe auto-generated integrity buffer for writes needs to be fully\ninitialized before being passed to the underlying block device,\notherwise the uninitialized memory can be read back by userspace or\nanyone with physical access to the storage device. If protection\ninformation is generated, that portion of the integrity buffer is\nalready initialized. The integrity data is also zeroed if PI generation\nis disabled via sysfs or the PI tuple size is 0. However, this misses\nthe case where PI is generated and the PI tuple size is nonzero, but the\nmetadata size is larger than the PI tuple. In this case, the remainder\n(\"opaque\") of the metadata is left uninitialized.\nGeneralize the BLK_INTEGRITY_CSUM_NONE check to cover any case when the\nmetadata is larger than just the PI tuple.",
"id": "GHSA-2mvm-xgm9-r324",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:40:15Z",
"published": "2026-01-25T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/765bf0a5880777c04ae98fc2a9f3b995737b3a64"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca22c566b89164f6e670af56ecc45f47ef3df819"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6072557b90e0c557df319a56f4a9dc482706d2c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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