GHSA-2MM4-P629-FJ4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks

Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies.

Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and potential kernel memory disclosure.

Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.

Additionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely with removing a misplaced BUG_ON().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99495"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:04Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks\n\nAdd or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the\nhandling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message\ntype 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related\nto reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware\ndeficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device\ndriver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially\nlength fields at message replies.\n\nAdd length validation before accessing reply message structures in\nzcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and\nzcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and\npotential kernel memory disclosure.\n\nAlso rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more\ncarefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t\nfor length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add\ndefensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies,\nvalidate both reply segments and derive the effective message length\nfrom the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment.\n\nAdditionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions\nwhich further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions\nand for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely\nwith removing a misplaced BUG_ON().",
  "id": "GHSA-2mm4-p629-fj4h",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99495"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f0aa2b560a6eca76778083b0c6f155bb458b56f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e9b339f323216d71f3ede8a0a427abf7859c486"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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