GHSA-2MFJ-XM96-46WM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 21:30 – Updated: 2024-10-25 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: Fix improper handling of refcount in ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count()

This patch addresses an issue with improper reference count handling in the ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count() function.

First, the function calls ice_get_vf_by_id(), which increments the reference count of the vf pointer. If the subsequent call to ice_get_vf_vsi() fails, the function currently returns an error without decrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, leading to a reference count leak. The correct behavior, as implemented in this patch, is to decrement the reference count using ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an error when vsi is NULL.

Second, the function calls ice_sriov_get_irqs(), which sets vf->first_vector_idx. If this call returns a negative value, indicating an error, the function returns an error without decrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, resulting in another reference count leak. The patch addresses this by adding a call to ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an error when vf->first_vector_idx < 0.

This bug was identified by an experimental static analysis tool developed by our team. The tool specializes in analyzing reference count operations and identifying potential mismanagement of reference counts. In this case, the tool flagged the missing decrement operation as a potential issue, leading to this patch.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-50020"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T20:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: Fix improper handling of refcount in ice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count()\n\nThis patch addresses an issue with improper reference count handling in the\nice_sriov_set_msix_vec_count() function.\n\nFirst, the function calls ice_get_vf_by_id(), which increments the\nreference count of the vf pointer. If the subsequent call to\nice_get_vf_vsi() fails, the function currently returns an error without\ndecrementing the reference count of the vf pointer, leading to a reference\ncount leak. The correct behavior, as implemented in this patch, is to\ndecrement the reference count using ice_put_vf(vf) before returning an\nerror when vsi is NULL.\n\nSecond, the function calls ice_sriov_get_irqs(), which sets\nvf-\u003efirst_vector_idx. If this call returns a negative value, indicating an\nerror, the function returns an error without decrementing the reference\ncount of the vf pointer, resulting in another reference count leak. The\npatch addresses this by adding a call to ice_put_vf(vf) before returning\nan error when vf-\u003efirst_vector_idx \u003c 0.\n\nThis bug was identified by an experimental static analysis tool developed\nby our team. The tool specializes in analyzing reference count operations\nand identifying potential mismanagement of reference counts. In this case,\nthe tool flagged the missing decrement operation as a potential issue,\nleading to this patch.",
  "id": "GHSA-2mfj-xm96-46wm",
  "modified": "2024-10-25T15:31:26Z",
  "published": "2024-10-21T21:30:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/416dbb815ca69684de148328990ba0ec53e6dbc1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d517cf89874c6039e6294b18d66f40988e62502a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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