GHSA-2MF3-MR2R-R4VF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 16:31 – Updated: 2026-08-18 16:31Overview
@rhinostone/swig is a maintained fork of the abandoned swig template engine and inherited the directory-traversal vulnerability tracked upstream as CVE-2023-25345 / GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6. The {% include %}, {% extends %}, and {% import %} tags resolve their target path through the filesystem loader without confining the result to the configured template root. A path that traverses upward (../) escapes the root and reads an arbitrary file from the host filesystem, whose contents are emitted into the rendered output.
Attack scenario
The dangerous case does not require the attacker to control template source — only template data (the locals passed at render time). An application that renders a trusted template whose include / extends path is variable-driven is exposed:
// application code — a configured filesystem loader with a basepath
swig.renderFile('page.html', { partial: req.query.partial });
{# page.html — trusted template #}
{% include partial %}
Setting ?partial=../../../../etc/passwd makes the loader resolve and read that file, and its contents are rendered into the response. A literal in trusted source is equally affected: {% include "../../../etc/passwd" %}.
Impact
Arbitrary local file disclosure (confidentiality). An attacker able to influence an include / extends / import path — directly, or via untrusted locals — can read files outside the template directory: application configuration, credentials, source code, /etc/passwd, and so on. There is no integrity or availability impact.
Affected & patched
Every published version up to and including 2.7.0 is affected — @rhinostone/swig, and the shared @rhinostone/swig-core loader, hence @rhinostone/swig-twig, @rhinostone/swig-jinja2, and @rhinostone/swig-django as well.
Fixed in 2.7.1: the filesystem loader now rejects any include / extends / import path that resolves outside the configured basepath root, including paths supplied through an untrusted runtime variable. A new allowOutsideRoot loader option is available for the rare case of intentionally reading files from outside the root.
Upgrade to 2.7.2 or later: 2.7.1 fixed the vulnerability but introduced a regression — a relative basepath wrongly rejected every in-root template path. 2.7.2 resolves the basepath to an absolute path before the check and restores correct in-root resolution.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to
2.7.2(or later). - If you cannot upgrade immediately: configure the filesystem loader with an explicit
basepath, and never pass untrusted data into an{% include %}/{% extends %}/{% import %}path.
References
- GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6 — https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6
- CVE-2023-25345 (NVD) — https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25345
- Upstream issue (swig-templates) — https://github.com/node-swig/swig-templates/issues/88
- Fix commit — https://github.com/gina-io/swig/commit/381bdc305e0b10e45368d56324328b9b4f7017fc
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@rhinostone/swig"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@rhinostone/swig-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@rhinostone/swig-twig"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@rhinostone/swig-jinja2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@rhinostone/swig-django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T16:31:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Overview\n\n`@rhinostone/swig` is a maintained fork of the abandoned `swig` template engine and inherited the directory-traversal vulnerability tracked upstream as CVE-2023-25345 / GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6. The `{% include %}`, `{% extends %}`, and `{% import %}` tags resolve their target path through the filesystem loader without confining the result to the configured template root. A path that traverses upward (`../`) escapes the root and reads an arbitrary file from the host filesystem, whose contents are emitted into the rendered output.\n\n### Attack scenario\n\nThe dangerous case does **not** require the attacker to control template source \u2014 only template **data** (the `locals` passed at render time). An application that renders a trusted template whose include / extends path is variable-driven is exposed:\n\n```js\n// application code \u2014 a configured filesystem loader with a basepath\nswig.renderFile(\u0027page.html\u0027, { partial: req.query.partial });\n```\n\n```\n{# page.html \u2014 trusted template #}\n{% include partial %}\n```\n\nSetting `?partial=../../../../etc/passwd` makes the loader resolve and read that file, and its contents are rendered into the response. A literal in trusted source is equally affected: `{% include \"../../../etc/passwd\" %}`.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary local file disclosure (confidentiality). An attacker able to influence an include / extends / import path \u2014 directly, or via untrusted `locals` \u2014 can read files outside the template directory: application configuration, credentials, source code, `/etc/passwd`, and so on. There is no integrity or availability impact.\n\n### Affected \u0026 patched\n\nEvery published version up to and including `2.7.0` is affected \u2014 `@rhinostone/swig`, and the shared `@rhinostone/swig-core` loader, hence `@rhinostone/swig-twig`, `@rhinostone/swig-jinja2`, and `@rhinostone/swig-django` as well.\n\nFixed in **`2.7.1`**: the filesystem loader now rejects any `include` / `extends` / `import` path that resolves outside the configured `basepath` root, including paths supplied through an untrusted runtime variable. A new `allowOutsideRoot` loader option is available for the rare case of intentionally reading files from outside the root.\n\n**Upgrade to `2.7.2` or later:** `2.7.1` fixed the vulnerability but introduced a regression \u2014 a *relative* `basepath` wrongly rejected every in-root template path. `2.7.2` resolves the `basepath` to an absolute path before the check and restores correct in-root resolution.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to `2.7.2` (or later).\n- If you cannot upgrade immediately: configure the filesystem loader with an explicit `basepath`, and never pass untrusted data into an `{% include %}` / `{% extends %}` / `{% import %}` path.\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6 \u2014 https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2rq5-699j-x7p6\n- CVE-2023-25345 (NVD) \u2014 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25345\n- Upstream issue (swig-templates) \u2014 https://github.com/node-swig/swig-templates/issues/88\n- Fix commit \u2014 https://github.com/gina-io/swig/commit/381bdc305e0b10e45368d56324328b9b4f7017fc",
"id": "GHSA-2mf3-mr2r-r4vf",
"modified": "2026-08-18T16:31:16Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T16:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gina-io/swig/security/advisories/GHSA-2mf3-mr2r-r4vf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25345"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gina-io/swig/commit/381bdc305e0b10e45368d56324328b9b4f7017fc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gina-io/swig"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@rhinostone/swig: arbitrary local file read via include/extends path traversal"
}
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