GHSA-2G34-2VMV-M9R2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: isci: Fix use-after-free in device removal path

The ISCI completion tasklet is initialized in isci_host_alloc() (drivers/scsi/isci/init.c:496) and scheduled from both MSI-X and legacy interrupt handlers (drivers/scsi/isci/host.c:223,613).

isci_host_deinit() stops the controller and waits for stop completion, but it never kills completion_tasklet before teardown continues. A top-of-function tasklet_kill() is not sufficient here: interrupts are only disabled when isci_host_stop_complete() runs, so until wait_for_stop() returns the IRQ handlers can still requeue the tasklet. The tasklet callback also re-enables interrupts after draining completions, so killing the tasklet before the source is quiesced leaves the same race open.

Once wait_for_stop() returns, no further IRQ-driven scheduling can occur. Kill completion_tasklet there so teardown cannot race a queued tasklet running on a dead ihost. On remove or unload, the stale callback can otherwise dereference ihost and touch ihost->smu_registers after the host lifetime ends.

A UML + KASAN analogue reproduced the failure class both with no tasklet_kill() and with tasklet_kill() placed before source quiesce, and stayed clean once the kill happened after quiescing the scheduling source.

This mirrors commit f6ab594672d4 ("scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in device removal path"), but ISCI needs the kill after wait_for_stop().

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64103"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:51Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: isci: Fix use-after-free in device removal path\n\nThe ISCI completion tasklet is initialized in isci_host_alloc()\n(drivers/scsi/isci/init.c:496) and scheduled from both MSI-X and legacy\ninterrupt handlers (drivers/scsi/isci/host.c:223,613).\n\nisci_host_deinit() stops the controller and waits for stop completion,\nbut it never kills completion_tasklet before teardown continues. A\ntop-of-function tasklet_kill() is not sufficient here: interrupts are\nonly disabled when isci_host_stop_complete() runs, so until\nwait_for_stop() returns the IRQ handlers can still requeue the\ntasklet. The tasklet callback also re-enables interrupts after draining\ncompletions, so killing the tasklet before the source is quiesced leaves\nthe same race open.\n\nOnce wait_for_stop() returns, no further IRQ-driven scheduling can\noccur. Kill completion_tasklet there so teardown cannot race a queued\ntasklet running on a dead ihost. On remove or unload, the stale callback\ncan otherwise dereference ihost and touch ihost-\u003esmu_registers after the\nhost lifetime ends.\n\nA UML + KASAN analogue reproduced the failure class both with no\ntasklet_kill() and with tasklet_kill() placed before source quiesce, and\nstayed clean once the kill happened after quiescing the scheduling\nsource.\n\nThis mirrors commit f6ab594672d4 (\"scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in\ndevice removal path\"), but ISCI needs the kill after wait_for_stop().",
  "id": "GHSA-2g34-2vmv-m9r2",
  "modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-07-19T18:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64103"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1412995e10c74644b47f242aea6e4f3d4180e806"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/309c6058622d080fe8c2fab87c30da82d834d989"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d40f2f103bb30f52f3dbadbe2c3fdf274a9763c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a83d3e4daba40d49324cec1c51ed261e1ea48cf1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab2266601a875982f2d2033f41e070a6d5e615e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b52a8d52c3125ec9a93106ed816582368de34426"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9ff8631006233ba246828ac70409d2cb2da38d3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb9e72c50e6c81a5903f27e0b397ce8525d7539b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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