GHSA-2CXV-R576-WFCV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
The verifier tracks changes in how PTR_TO_PACKET registers' bounds are modified across subprog boundaries. PTR_TO_PACKET registers are actually passed as PTR_TO_MEM, which is assumed valid for the entire call. This is not the case with packet memory, where a pskb_* call may invalidate its memory region.
Reject BPF code that passes PTR_TO_PACKET pointers to subprogs that may mutate a packet. We cannot pass the pointer as a true PTR_TO_PACKET because we would also need to somehow pass the PTR_TO_PACKET_META or PTR_TO_PACKET_END to the subprog. Since we cannot avoid representing the pointer in the subprog as PTR_TO_MEM, only permit it if the subprog is guaranteed not to mutate the packet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98589"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:11Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs\n\nThe verifier tracks changes in how PTR_TO_PACKET registers\u0027\nbounds are modified across subprog boundaries. PTR_TO_PACKET\nregisters are actually passed as PTR_TO_MEM, which is assumed\nvalid for the entire call. This is not the case with packet memory,\nwhere a pskb_* call may invalidate its memory region.\n\nReject BPF code that passes PTR_TO_PACKET pointers to subprogs that\nmay mutate a packet. We cannot pass the pointer as a true PTR_TO_PACKET\nbecause we would also need to somehow pass the PTR_TO_PACKET_META\nor PTR_TO_PACKET_END to the subprog. Since we cannot avoid representing\nthe pointer in the subprog as PTR_TO_MEM, only permit it if the\nsubprog is guaranteed not to mutate the packet.",
"id": "GHSA-2cxv-r576-wfcv",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:31:55Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:31:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98589"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b6b2bb9b90ad1e2d94d18f626258a1dbbdee0ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6c1edfbe240e4377038a0e1d233ad81fde9a21b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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