GHSA-2CVJ-G5R5-JRRG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-10 21:08 – Updated: 2025-04-10 21:08An authenticated system user at the root, namespace, or database levels can use the DEFINE ANALYZER statement to point to arbitrary file locations on the file system, and should the file be tab separated with two columns, the analyzer can be leveraged to exfiltrate the content.
This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Low, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment.
Impact
Limited to unauthorised access to 2 column TSV files on the file system
Patches
A patch has been created that introduces a new environment variable, SURREAL_FILE_ALLOWLIST , which contains a list of allowed file paths. When a mapping file is processed, the mapper checks if the file’s path is within one of the allowed paths.
- Versions 2.1.5, 2.2.2 and later are not affected by this issue.
Workarounds
Users unable to update may want to limit those with root, namespace, or database level users to trusted parties only.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "surrealdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "surrealdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-10T21:08:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An authenticated system user at the root, namespace, or database levels can use the `DEFINE ANALYZER` statement to point to arbitrary file locations on the file system, and should the file be tab separated with two columns, the analyzer can be leveraged to exfiltrate the content.\n\nThis issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53\u0027s preliminary finding is Low, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment.\n\n### Impact\nLimited to unauthorised access to 2 column TSV files on the file system\n\n### Patches\nA patch has been created that introduces a new environment variable, `SURREAL_FILE_ALLOWLIST` , which contains a list of allowed file paths. When a mapping file is processed, the mapper checks if the file\u2019s path is within one of the allowed paths.\n\n- Versions 2.1.5, 2.2.2 and later are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\nUsers unable to update may want to limit those with root, namespace, or database level users to trusted parties only.\n\n### References\n[SurrealQL Documentation - DEFINE ANALYZER](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/analyzer#define-analyzer-statement)\n[#5600](https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/5600)",
"id": "GHSA-2cvj-g5r5-jrrg",
"modified": "2025-04-10T21:08:50Z",
"published": "2025-04-10T21:08:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-2cvj-g5r5-jrrg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/5600"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "SurrealDB has local file read of 2-column TSV files via analyzers "
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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