GHSA-2CH6-X3G4-7759
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 23:19 – Updated: 2026-03-03 23:19Summary
commands.allowFrom is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include ctx.From (conversation identity) as a sender candidate.
When commands.allowFrom contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord channel:<id> or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.22-2 - Patched version:
2026.2.23(released)
Details
Root cause: resolveSenderCandidates() in src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts always included ctx.From in candidate evaluation used by commands.allowFrom authorization checks.
ctx.From is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization.
Impact
In affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured commands.allowFrom with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows.
Fix
Main branch now treats commands.allowFrom as sender-only:
- ctx.From is no longer included as a general sender candidate.
- ctx.From is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped.
- Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation.
Fix Commit(s)
08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the released version (2026.2.23). This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.
OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T23:19:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`commands.allowFrom` is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include `ctx.From` (conversation identity) as a sender candidate.\n\nWhen `commands.allowFrom` contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord `channel:\u003cid\u003e` or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.22-2`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.23` (released)\n\n### Details\nRoot cause: `resolveSenderCandidates()` in `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts` always included `ctx.From` in candidate evaluation used by `commands.allowFrom` authorization checks.\n\n`ctx.From` is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization.\n\n### Impact\nIn affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured `commands.allowFrom` with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows.\n\n### Fix\nMain branch now treats `commands.allowFrom` as sender-only:\n- `ctx.From` is no longer included as a general sender candidate.\n- `ctx.From` is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped.\n- Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the released version (`2026.2.23`). This advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759",
"modified": "2026-03-03T23:19:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T23:19:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.