GHSA-2CH6-X3G4-7759

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 23:19 – Updated: 2026-03-03 23:19
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From
Details

Summary

commands.allowFrom is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include ctx.From (conversation identity) as a sender candidate.

When commands.allowFrom contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord channel:<id> or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.22-2
  • Patched version: 2026.2.23 (released)

Details

Root cause: resolveSenderCandidates() in src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts always included ctx.From in candidate evaluation used by commands.allowFrom authorization checks.

ctx.From is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization.

Impact

In affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured commands.allowFrom with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows.

Fix

Main branch now treats commands.allowFrom as sender-only: - ctx.From is no longer included as a general sender candidate. - ctx.From is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped. - Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the released version (2026.2.23). This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.

OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T23:19:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`commands.allowFrom` is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include `ctx.From` (conversation identity) as a sender candidate.\n\nWhen `commands.allowFrom` contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord `channel:\u003cid\u003e` or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.22-2`\n- Patched version: `2026.2.23` (released)\n\n### Details\nRoot cause: `resolveSenderCandidates()` in `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts` always included `ctx.From` in candidate evaluation used by `commands.allowFrom` authorization checks.\n\n`ctx.From` is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization.\n\n### Impact\nIn affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured `commands.allowFrom` with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows.\n\n### Fix\nMain branch now treats `commands.allowFrom` as sender-only:\n- `ctx.From` is no longer included as a general sender candidate.\n- `ctx.From` is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped.\n- Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the released version (`2026.2.23`). This advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T23:19:46Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T23:19:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From"
}



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