GHSA-2C5X-4JGF-88MJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:34 – Updated: 2026-05-21 20:34
VLAI
Summary
NocoDB: SSRF Protection Bypass in Notification Webhook Plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams)
Details

Summary

The request-filtering-agent SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because httpAgent / httpsAgent were passed as part of the request body rather than the axios config. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.

Details

axios.post(url, data, config) expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:

// packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams — identical pattern)
return await axios.post(webhook_url, {
  text,
  httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),   // wrong position — serialised, not used
  httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),
});

The webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url pointing to an internal host; on trigger, WebhookInvoker.invoke() calls the plugin's sendMessage() which performs the outbound axios.post with no SSRF filtering applied.

This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.

Impact

  • Authenticated user (Editor+) can reach cloud-metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) and internal services.
  • Combined with verbose hook logging (NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL), response bodies may be exfiltrated.

Credit

This issue was reported by @ik0z.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.301.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46548"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:34:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `request-filtering-agent` SSRF protection was non-functional in the four notification webhook plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams) because `httpAgent` / `httpsAgent` were passed as part of the request **body** rather than the axios **config**. An authenticated user with hook-creation permission could direct outbound POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts.\n\n### Details\n\n`axios.post(url, data, config)` expects connection agents in the third (config) argument. In all four plugins, the agents were placed in the second (data) argument and serialised as JSON body content:\n\n```ts\n// packages/nocodb/src/plugins/slack/Slack.ts (and Discord / Mattermost / Teams \u2014 identical pattern)\nreturn await axios.post(webhook_url, {\n  text,\n  httpAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),   // wrong position \u2014 serialised, not used\n  httpsAgent: useAgent(webhook_url),\n});\n```\n\nThe webhook flow: an Editor+ user creates a webhook with `notification.payload.channels[].webhook_url` pointing to an internal host; on trigger, `WebhookInvoker.invoke()` calls the plugin\u0027s `sendMessage()` which performs the outbound `axios.post` with no SSRF filtering applied.\n\nThis is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9, which covers a blind SSRF via HEAD in the upload-by-URL path.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Authenticated user (Editor+) can reach cloud-metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`) and internal services.\n- Combined with verbose hook logging (`NC_AUTOMATION_LOG_LEVEL=ALL`), response bodies may be exfiltrated.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).",
  "id": "GHSA-2c5x-4jgf-88mj",
  "modified": "2026-05-21T20:34:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-21T20:34:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-2c5x-4jgf-88mj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB: SSRF Protection Bypass in Notification Webhook Plugins (Slack, Discord, Mattermost, Teams)"
}


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