GHSA-29CC-VCQ3-44CF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:07 – Updated: 2025-05-13 12:31A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM ROS M2100 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS M2200 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS M969 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC20 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC30 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC40 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC41 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC8388 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC8388 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RP110 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS400 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS401 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416v2 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416v2 V5.X (All versions < 5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000A (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000H (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000T (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900GP (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS920L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS920W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS930L (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS930W (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS940G (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS969 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2200 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2288 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2288 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300P V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300P V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2488 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2488 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900 V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900 V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900C (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900G V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900G V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900R (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG920P V4.X (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG920P V5.X (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSL910 (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST2228 (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST916C (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST916P (All versions < V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS i800 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i801 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i802 (All versions < V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i803 (All versions < V4.3.7). The DHCP client in affected devices fails to properly sanitize incoming DHCP packets. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause memory to be overwritten, potentially allowing remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-31895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-07-13T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM ROS M2100 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS M2200 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS M969 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC20 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC30 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC40 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC41 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC8388 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RMC8388 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RP110 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS400 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS401 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416v2 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS416v2 V5.X (All versions \u003c 5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000A (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000H (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS8000T (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900GP (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900L (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS900W (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910L (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS910W (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS920L (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS920W (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS930L (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS930W (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS940G (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RS969 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2200 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2288 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2288 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300P V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2300P V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2488 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG2488 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900 V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900C (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900G V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900G V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG900R (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG920P V4.X (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSG920P V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RSL910 (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST2228 (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST916C (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS RST916P (All versions \u003c V5.5.4), RUGGEDCOM ROS i800 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i801 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i802 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7), RUGGEDCOM ROS i803 (All versions \u003c V4.3.7). The DHCP client in affected devices fails to properly sanitize incoming DHCP packets. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause memory to be overwritten, potentially allowing remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-29cc-vcq3-44cf",
"modified": "2025-05-13T12:31:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:07:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-373591.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-373591.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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