GHSA-28XH-CHPH-8X29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-10 09:30 – Updated: 2024-11-25 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: fix missing sk_buff release in seg6_input_core
The seg6_input() function is responsible for adding the SRH into a packet, delegating the operation to the seg6_input_core(). This function uses the skb_cow_head() to ensure that there is sufficient headroom in the sk_buff for accommodating the link-layer header. In the event that the skb_cow_header() function fails, the seg6_input_core() catches the error but it does not release the sk_buff, which will result in a memory leak.
This issue was introduced in commit af3b5158b89d ("ipv6: sr: fix BUG due to headroom too small after SRH push") and persists even after commit 7a3f5b0de364 ("netfilter: add netfilter hooks to SRv6 data plane"), where the entire seg6_input() code was refactored to deal with netfilter hooks.
The proposed patch addresses the identified memory leak by requiring the seg6_input_core() function to release the sk_buff in the event that skb_cow_head() fails.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39490"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-10T08:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: sr: fix missing sk_buff release in seg6_input_core\n\nThe seg6_input() function is responsible for adding the SRH into a\npacket, delegating the operation to the seg6_input_core(). This function\nuses the skb_cow_head() to ensure that there is sufficient headroom in\nthe sk_buff for accommodating the link-layer header.\nIn the event that the skb_cow_header() function fails, the\nseg6_input_core() catches the error but it does not release the sk_buff,\nwhich will result in a memory leak.\n\nThis issue was introduced in commit af3b5158b89d (\"ipv6: sr: fix BUG due\nto headroom too small after SRH push\") and persists even after commit\n7a3f5b0de364 (\"netfilter: add netfilter hooks to SRv6 data plane\"),\nwhere the entire seg6_input() code was refactored to deal with netfilter\nhooks.\n\nThe proposed patch addresses the identified memory leak by requiring the\nseg6_input_core() function to release the sk_buff in the event that\nskb_cow_head() fails.",
"id": "GHSA-28xh-chph-8x29",
"modified": "2024-11-25T21:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-07-10T09:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39490"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5447f9708d9e4c17a647b16a9cb29e9e02820bd9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f1fc3b86eaea70be6abcae2e9aa7e7b99453864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8688218e38111ace457509d8f0cad75f79c1a7a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4df8c7670a73752201cbde215254598efdf6ce8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5fec1588642e415a3d72e02140160661b303940"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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