GHSA-28QX-7JQ4-9V6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull() use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight.
IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so instead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types, simply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header.
Checking skb->dev->type alone is not enough. We have to cater for a corner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device to an Ethernet one, and skb->dev then says nothing about the framing the skb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target's ingress hook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also require mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so the device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed frame rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or without IFE.
That corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth that has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this patch:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000 data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657) tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522) tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328) tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728)
With Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of hard_header_len.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:16:57Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames\n\nact_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses\nskb-\u003edev-\u003ehard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only\ncorrect for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not\nmatch the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN\nwhile nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull()\nuse the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight.\n\nIFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites\nh_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so\ninstead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types,\nsimply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header.\n\nChecking skb-\u003edev-\u003etype alone is not enough. We have to cater for a\ncorner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device\nto an Ethernet one, and skb-\u003edev then says nothing about the framing the\nskb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target\u0027s ingress\nhook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also\nrequire mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so\nthe device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed\nframe rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or\nwithout IFE.\n\nThat corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth\nthat has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this\npatch:\n\n skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000\n data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3\n kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!\n Call Trace:\n skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657)\n tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874)\n tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463)\n netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522)\n tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328)\n tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489)\n tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463)\n process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728)\n\nWith Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of\nhard_header_len.",
"id": "GHSA-28qx-7jq4-9v6v",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/138b0054021fd7d57bc3eb68b3f4e2bcec037849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b483f7791b079bb97d411f1066652ff659207ff"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d218ea7df6eba076171f2d4897a429a31f2139f0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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