GHSA-28MQ-63WC-4252
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 09:30 – Updated: 2026-10-01 09:30MISP contains a vulnerability in its one-time password (OTP) authentication flow that allows replay of a consumed HOTP (paper) token and rewinding of the token counter.
The HOTP verification logic compared the submitted token against a counter value that was cached in the user's session at the time the password was entered, rather than against the authoritative counter stored in the database. Because the session-cached counter is not updated after a token is successfully consumed, an attacker who holds a valid session (password already submitted) can reuse a previously burned HOTP token. The stale cached counter still matches the replayed token, granting a second successful authentication and effectively rewinding the counter state.
Preconditions:
-
The target user has HOTP (paper token) second-factor authentication enabled.
-
The attacker possesses a valid session in which the password step has already been completed (the OTP step is pending).
-
The attacker has access to at least one HOTP token value (e.g., a paper token list).
Security impact:
-
Bypass of the second authentication factor, allowing unauthorized access to a user's MISP account.
-
Corruption of the HOTP counter state, potentially invalidating subsequent legitimate tokens or enabling further replays.
Affected versions: <2.5.48.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-01T08:16:51Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MISP contains a vulnerability in its one-time password (OTP) authentication flow that allows replay of a consumed HOTP (paper) token and rewinding of the token counter.\n\nThe HOTP verification logic compared the submitted token against a counter value that was cached in the user\u0027s session at the time the password was entered, rather than against the authoritative counter stored in the database. Because the session-cached counter is not updated after a token is successfully consumed, an attacker who holds a valid session (password already submitted) can reuse a previously burned HOTP token. The stale cached counter still matches the replayed token, granting a second successful authentication and effectively rewinding the counter state.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- The target user has HOTP (paper token) second-factor authentication enabled.\n\n- The attacker possesses a valid session in which the password step has already been completed (the OTP step is pending).\n\n- The attacker has access to at least one HOTP token value (e.g., a paper token list).\n\nSecurity impact:\n\n- Bypass of the second authentication factor, allowing unauthorized access to a user\u0027s MISP account.\n\n- Corruption of the HOTP counter state, potentially invalidating subsequent legitimate tokens or enabling further replays.\n\nAffected versions: \u003c2.5.48.",
"id": "GHSA-28mq-63wc-4252",
"modified": "2026-10-01T09:30:32Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T09:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/f34aee2c7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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