GHSA-27G8-R9VW-765X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-27 18:39 – Updated: 2021-05-25 20:20This security advisory relates to a newly discovered capability in our query infrastructure to directly or indirectly expose the values of private fields, bypassing the configured access control.
This is an access control related oracle attack in that the attack method guides an attacker during their attempt to reveal information they do not have access to. The complexity of completing the attack is limited by some length-dependent behaviors and the fidelity of the exposed information.
Impact
Under some circumstances, field values or field value meta data can be determined, despite the field or list having read access control configured. If you use private fields or lists, you may be impacted.
Patches
None, at this time
Workarounds
None, at this time
References
None
For more information
For the protection of the community and private deployments, we think that the best course of action will be to not disclose further details on any open GitHub issues related to this advisory until a hot-fix or work-around has been deployed or published.
If needed, you can email us at keystone@thinkmill.com.au
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@keystonejs/keystone"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "19.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-25T20:20:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-24T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This security advisory relates to a newly discovered capability in our query infrastructure to directly or indirectly expose the values of private fields, bypassing the configured access control.\n\nThis is an access control related oracle attack in that the attack method guides an attacker during their attempt to reveal information they do not have access to. The complexity of completing the attack is limited by some length-dependent behaviors and the fidelity of the exposed information.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnder some circumstances, field values or field value meta data can be determined, despite the field or list having `read` access control configured. If you use private fields or lists, you may be impacted.\n\n### Patches\n\nNone, at this time\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone, at this time\n\n### References\n\nNone\n\n### For more information\n\nFor the protection of the community and private deployments, we think that the best course of action will be to not disclose further details on any open GitHub issues related to this advisory until a hot-fix or work-around has been deployed or published.\n\nIf needed, you can email us at keystone@thinkmill.com.au",
"id": "GHSA-27g8-r9vw-765x",
"modified": "2021-05-25T20:20:03Z",
"published": "2021-05-27T18:39:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keystonejs/keystone-5/security/advisories/GHSA-27g8-r9vw-765x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32624"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Private Field data leak"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.