GHSA-25G3-WM5V-78G8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Serialize fragmented ISO packet queueing
The fragmented path in hci_queue_iso() calls __skb_queue_tail() without holding conn->data_q.lock. The socket lock serializes senders, but the transmit worker can concurrently remove packets from this queue using skb_dequeue().
After an insertion saves the old tail pointer, hci_sched_iso() can dequeue that packet and pass it to the driver. The driver can free the packet before the insertion resumes and writes to the old tail's next pointer, causing a use-after-free. Concurrent updates can also corrupt the queue.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_send_iso+0xc7d/0xe10 Call Trace: hci_send_iso+0xc7d/0xe10 iso_sock_sendmsg+0x710/0x900 __sys_sendto+0x34a/0x3a0
Allocated by task 86: __alloc_skb+0xdd/0x820 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x7e/0x770 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x67a/0x820 bt_skb_sendmsg.constprop.0+0xc0/0x6c0 iso_sock_sendmsg+0x44e/0x900
Freed by task 90: kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0 vhci_read+0x33f/0x4d0 vfs_read+0x177/0xa20
Hold the queue lock across the entire fragment batch, as hci_queue_acl() does, to serialize insertion against dequeue while preserving fragment ordering.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98733"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:26Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_core: Serialize fragmented ISO packet queueing\n\nThe fragmented path in hci_queue_iso() calls __skb_queue_tail() without\nholding conn-\u003edata_q.lock. The socket lock serializes senders, but the\ntransmit worker can concurrently remove packets from this queue using\nskb_dequeue().\n\nAfter an insertion saves the old tail pointer, hci_sched_iso() can dequeue\nthat packet and pass it to the driver. The driver can free the packet\nbefore the insertion resumes and writes to the old tail\u0027s next pointer,\ncausing a use-after-free. Concurrent updates can also corrupt the queue.\n\nKASAN reported:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_send_iso+0xc7d/0xe10\n Call Trace:\n hci_send_iso+0xc7d/0xe10\n iso_sock_sendmsg+0x710/0x900\n __sys_sendto+0x34a/0x3a0\n\n Allocated by task 86:\n __alloc_skb+0xdd/0x820\n alloc_skb_with_frags+0x7e/0x770\n sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x67a/0x820\n bt_skb_sendmsg.constprop.0+0xc0/0x6c0\n iso_sock_sendmsg+0x44e/0x900\n\n Freed by task 90:\n kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0\n vhci_read+0x33f/0x4d0\n vfs_read+0x177/0xa20\n\nHold the queue lock across the entire fragment batch, as hci_queue_acl()\ndoes, to serialize insertion against dequeue while preserving fragment\nordering.",
"id": "GHSA-25g3-wm5v-78g8",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:58Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98733"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a572db43c057566771b485598ad2e66cb390821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/545fa70f730eb648a610a2f4b2d270865f77b619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/708cdd203d0bbcf9255fffb2e4c308d5b28851a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7161730a3ab3f0a3896000db7ab0284683936e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6d709981208567868c5c01ebd1bec5e5e7fdab0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e328b5823fa6b0b160d0922d6d68323e910d09a4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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