GHSA-257G-7VRP-J9F8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:36
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

dm cache policy smq: check allocation under invalidate lock

commit 2d1f7b65f5de ("dm cache policy smq: fix missing locks in invalidating cache blocks") added mq->lock around the destructive part of smq_invalidate_mapping(), but left the e->allocated check outside the critical section.

That leaves a check-then-act race. Two concurrent invalidators can both observe e->allocated as true before either of them takes mq->lock. The first invalidator that acquires the lock removes the entry from the queues and hash table and then calls free_entry(), which clears e->allocated and puts the entry back on the free list. The second invalidator can then acquire mq->lock and continue with the stale result of the unlocked check.

This can corrupt the SMQ queues or hash table by deleting an entry that is no longer on those structures. It can also hit the allocation check in free_entry() when the same entry is freed again.

Move the allocation check under mq->lock so the predicate and the destructive operations are serialized by the same lock.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53265"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm cache policy smq: check allocation under invalidate lock\n\ncommit 2d1f7b65f5de (\"dm cache policy smq: fix missing locks in\ninvalidating cache blocks\") added mq-\u003elock around the destructive part of\nsmq_invalidate_mapping(), but left the e-\u003eallocated check outside the\ncritical section.\n\nThat leaves a check-then-act race. Two concurrent invalidators can both\nobserve e-\u003eallocated as true before either of them takes mq-\u003elock. The\nfirst invalidator that acquires the lock removes the entry from the\nqueues and hash table and then calls free_entry(), which clears\ne-\u003eallocated and puts the entry back on the free list. The second\ninvalidator can then acquire mq-\u003elock and continue with the stale result\nof the unlocked check.\n\nThis can corrupt the SMQ queues or hash table by deleting an entry that\nis no longer on those structures. It can also hit the allocation check in\nfree_entry() when the same entry is freed again.\n\nMove the allocation check under mq-\u003elock so the predicate and the\ndestructive operations are serialized by the same lock.",
  "id": "GHSA-257g-7vrp-j9f8",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T03:36:18Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T09:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03ffe1112ed88bb3a9bd0b971549bf4d64bfc59a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13da856c86fb8c2ccab95034fd77da1bb2c2a17c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42ff6774ecd9d7f70d599cb71ff64373a1da4948"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4892561552d671bd8c4da5ebb70e9fbb1ec446e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c242c7af2aecf0b538b8623bdb86b8b441da38d9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c57570fba24016ec25ec046ab44db39143fb7a64"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3f0a606b9f278ece8a0df626ded9c4044071235"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d886945fcb0f8c9dc6b39928d7a96c95c587346c"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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