GHSA-2568-8WCM-QH64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()
Currently, in ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kzalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_params)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation.
The reader in ath12k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride.
Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90399"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath12k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()\n\nCurrently, in ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kzalloc() sizes the\nmac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to\nmin(firmware_len, sizeof(struct ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_params)). The\nsubsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot\nvia C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends\nshort TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the\nallocation.\n\nThe reader in ath12k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the\nbuffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match\nthat stride.\n\nFix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the\npointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably\nconsistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.\n\nTested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3",
"id": "GHSA-2568-8wcm-qh64",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26f8f87f0a556e7984366c64cebc16d49e15d22f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c6eb712a91fa079be6f9f1419c96e0ad2227081"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79c6f4f7d16eea1bcb8bc5c8fd6ec04a01b0614f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9a5d12cbdeb860306f8d47c92caee0ea6ee0e0a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3355e0fdbbf531ca8b82a6a3feb80a1b7306a8b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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