GHSA-24J7-GR38-QHJC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ
srp_recv_done() passes wc->byte_len to srp_process_rsp(). It passes nothing to srp_process_cred_req() and srp_process_aer_req(), which read fixed-size fields from the receive buffer without checking that those fields were received.
The buffer size is max_ti_iu_len, which comes from the login response and is not validated. A target that advertises 8 and then sends an 8-byte SRP_CRED_REQ makes the initiator read req->tag from beyond the end of the buffer. req->tag is copied into the SRP_CRED_RSP and sent back, so those bytes reach the target. SRP_AER_REQ behaves the same way and also reads req->lun.
The leak is 8 bytes per response. max_ti_iu_len also decides which slab cache the buffer comes from. With 8 the buffer is a kmalloc-8 object and the read is entirely outside it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_recv_done+0x172b/0x1aa0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104714da8 by task kworker/u8:3/50 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888104714da0, ffff888104714da8)
Without KASAN the returned bytes are whatever is next in the slab. One run returned ".strtab".
rsp->data[3] in srp_process_rsp() has the same problem: only resp_data_len is checked before it is read.
Drop a request that is shorter than the structure being parsed, and check byte_len before the tsk_mgmt read.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90307"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:28Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ\n\nsrp_recv_done() passes wc-\u003ebyte_len to srp_process_rsp(). It passes\nnothing to srp_process_cred_req() and srp_process_aer_req(), which read\nfixed-size fields from the receive buffer without checking that those\nfields were received.\n\nThe buffer size is max_ti_iu_len, which comes from the login response\nand is not validated. A target that advertises 8 and then sends an\n8-byte SRP_CRED_REQ makes the initiator read req-\u003etag from beyond the\nend of the buffer. req-\u003etag is copied into the SRP_CRED_RSP and sent\nback, so those bytes reach the target. SRP_AER_REQ behaves the same way\nand also reads req-\u003elun.\n\nThe leak is 8 bytes per response. max_ti_iu_len also decides which slab\ncache the buffer comes from. With 8 the buffer is a kmalloc-8 object and\nthe read is entirely outside it:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_recv_done+0x172b/0x1aa0\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104714da8 by task kworker/u8:3/50\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 8-byte region [ffff888104714da0, ffff888104714da8)\n\nWithout KASAN the returned bytes are whatever is next in the slab. One\nrun returned \".strtab\".\n\nrsp-\u003edata[3] in srp_process_rsp() has the same problem: only\nresp_data_len is checked before it is read.\n\nDrop a request that is shorter than the structure being parsed, and\ncheck byte_len before the tsk_mgmt read.",
"id": "GHSA-24j7-gr38-qhjc",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/001adf2fe87d1ab677c014a97467bbea5153ae5f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e7ba617514902501514d577647d866e670dad90"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/138eb2f0ef02adfe6ad126afad5b54c56b5046ee"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3787f4c3e0d813d6c56be9f6dfaf66f8551fb0a7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f7fdf561f1ec3b523c39708df00bd808671668d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/961ac0f0c5e414abdd6b33fae84b311d9fde0bd0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc2272c00d7c00ee2a69b57f7ca9caaefcbdb8cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa1b33fdab3e79dce83721ead3220200a2dbec22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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