GHSA-247V-7CW6-Q57V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 17:43 – Updated: 2026-03-03 17:43Summary
A privilege escalation and authentication bypass vulnerability in OpenSTAManager allows any attacker to arbitrarily change a user's group (idgruppo) by directly calling modules/utenti/actions.php. This can promote an existing account (e.g. agent) into the Amministratori group as well as demote any user including existing administrators.
Details
modules/utenti/actions.php is reachable directly via http://<IP>:8080/modules/utenti/actions.php and processes privileged information without requiring any authentication or authorization checks on fields like idgruppo. As a result, an attacker can submit a crafted POST request that updates the targets record and assigns it to the administrator group.
The file explicitly sets:
$skip_permissions = true;
include_once __DIR__.'/../../core.php';
core.php then invokes:
Permissions::skip();
Thus, disabling any authentication and permission enforcement. As a result, this file processes operations based on the op parameter in the POST request, not only update_user. Sensitive fields like idgruppo and others can be updated without verifying anything.
PoC
A target username exists, such as "agent" with an ID of 4. No authentication or cookies are required. Send the following POST request via Burp Suite or similar:
The target's group is updated in the database.
Verify the changes in the database before and after the POST request:
Changes also visible in the administrator panel, they have been moved from the Agenti group to Amministratori.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can assign administrator privileges to existing users, modify group memberships, enable/disable accounts and other operations that are exposed in the file. This can lead to a full compromise of the application.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "devcode-it/openstamanager"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.9.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27012"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T17:43:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA privilege escalation and authentication bypass vulnerability in OpenSTAManager allows any attacker to arbitrarily change a user\u0027s group (`idgruppo`) by directly calling `modules/utenti/actions.php`. This can promote an existing account (e.g. agent) into the Amministratori group as well as demote any user including existing administrators.\n\n### Details\n`modules/utenti/actions.php` is reachable directly via `http://\u003cIP\u003e:8080/modules/utenti/actions.php` and processes privileged information without requiring any authentication or authorization checks on fields like idgruppo. As a result, an attacker can submit a crafted POST request that updates the targets record and assigns it to the administrator group.\n\nThe file explicitly sets:\n```PHP\n$skip_permissions = true;\ninclude_once __DIR__.\u0027/../../core.php\u0027;\n```\n`core.php` then invokes:\n\n```PHP\nPermissions::skip();\n```\nThus, disabling any authentication and permission enforcement. As a result, this file processes operations based on the `op` parameter in the POST request, not only `update_user`. Sensitive fields like `idgruppo` and others can be updated without verifying anything.\n\n### PoC\nA target username exists, such as \"agent\" with an ID of 4. No authentication or cookies are required. Send the following POST request via Burp Suite or similar:\n\u003cimg width=\"1094\" height=\"255\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2e8cb148-1b5d-4e5c-9c73-05ed75d64188\" /\u003e\nThe target\u0027s group is updated in the database.\nVerify the changes in the database before and after the POST request:\n\u003cimg width=\"1053\" height=\"430\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/49f63ca0-8a04-4dd1-b27c-69699d2ce26f\" /\u003e\nChanges also visible in the administrator panel, they have been moved from the Agenti group to Amministratori.\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker can assign administrator privileges to existing users, modify group memberships, enable/disable accounts and other operations that are exposed in the file. This can lead to a full compromise of the application.",
"id": "GHSA-247v-7cw6-q57v",
"modified": "2026-03-03T17:43:49Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T17:43:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager/security/advisories/GHSA-247v-7cw6-q57v"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/devcode-it/openstamanager"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenSTAManager affected by unauthenticated privilege escalation via modules/utenti/actions.php"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.