GHSA-23G4-Q58Q-5PXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-10-30 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage
Commit ("iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts locally") moved the call to enable_drhd_fault_handling() to a code path that does not hold any lock while traversing the drhd list. Fix it by ensuring the dmar_global_lock lock is held when traversing the drhd list.
Without this fix, the following warning is triggered: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.14.0-rc3 #55 Not tainted
drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:2046 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by cpuhp/1/23: #0: ffffffff84a67c50 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0 #1: ffffffff84a6a380 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3 #55 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xd0 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x159/0x1f0 ? __pfx_enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x10/0x10 enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x151/0x180 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1df/0x990 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x1ea/0x2c0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f5/0x2e0 ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x12a/0x2d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Holding the lock in enable_drhd_fault_handling() triggers a lockdep splat about a possible deadlock between dmar_global_lock and cpu_hotplug_lock. This is avoided by not holding dmar_global_lock when calling iommu_device_register(), which initiates the device probe process.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21876"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-27T15:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/vt-d: Fix suspicious RCU usage\n\nCommit \u003cd74169ceb0d2\u003e (\"iommu/vt-d: Allocate DMAR fault interrupts\nlocally\") moved the call to enable_drhd_fault_handling() to a code\npath that does not hold any lock while traversing the drhd list. Fix\nit by ensuring the dmar_global_lock lock is held when traversing the\ndrhd list.\n\nWithout this fix, the following warning is triggered:\n =============================\n WARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n 6.14.0-rc3 #55 Not tainted\n -----------------------------\n drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:2046 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!\n other info that might help us debug this:\n rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1\n 2 locks held by cpuhp/1/23:\n #0: ffffffff84a67c50 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0\n #1: ffffffff84a6a380 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x87/0x2c0\n stack backtrace:\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 23 Comm: cpuhp/1 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3 #55\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0xb7/0xd0\n lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x159/0x1f0\n ? __pfx_enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x10/0x10\n enable_drhd_fault_handling+0x151/0x180\n cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1df/0x990\n cpuhp_thread_fun+0x1ea/0x2c0\n smpboot_thread_fn+0x1f5/0x2e0\n ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0x12a/0x2d0\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x60\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nHolding the lock in enable_drhd_fault_handling() triggers a lockdep splat\nabout a possible deadlock between dmar_global_lock and cpu_hotplug_lock.\nThis is avoided by not holding dmar_global_lock when calling\niommu_device_register(), which initiates the device probe process.",
"id": "GHSA-23g4-q58q-5pxc",
"modified": "2025-10-30T18:31:03Z",
"published": "2025-03-27T15:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4117c72938493a77ab53cc4b8284be8fb6ec8065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b150654f74bf0df8e6a7936d5ec51400d9ec06d8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c603ccbe91d189849e1439134598ec567088dcec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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