GCVE-1988-2026-0559

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 02:14 – Updated: 2026-11-13 02:14
VLAI
Title
InfiniteWP Client: the NOSSL signing key has 31 bits of secret — recovered live in 291.9 seconds
Summary
InfiniteWP Client 1.13.10 — a WordPress management plugin on roughly 200,000 installs — speaks to its management panel through two authentication branches. The strong branch verifies an RSA signature. The other, NOSSL, is selected by the enrolling panel setting one request parameter, on hosts fully capable of RSA. Once its key is stored, the selection is permanent and the RSA branch is unreachable. The stored key is generated as: md5(base64_encode(panel_public_key) . rand(0, getrandmax())) The public key is public. The secret is a single rand() result: at most 2^31 values. The authentication value signs only the action and message ID — parameters are never signed — and message-ID ordering is enforced only on the auto_login path, so a captured request replays with altered parameters. Live proof, against our own instance only: from one captured get_stats request and the panel's public key, the key was recovered offline in 291.9 seconds (~7.36M candidates/sec), byte-identical to the site-issued key. A forged maintain_site command signed with the recovered key was accepted and wrote database options that had not existed before. The key never rotates: recover it once, forge forever. Scope, stated plainly: every shipped copy carries the construction; exploitation requires a NOSSL-enrolled site. The NOSSL-enrolled share of the 200,000 installs is not externally measurable and is not claimed here. Paper: https://archive.org/details/knell-thirty-one-bits Mirror: https://github.com/the-knell/Thirty-One-Bits Key: 133883AB9F6EDE5B9BA6B82E27BEDAF0CE152F25 (knell) Verify: gpg --import knell-public.asc, then gpg --verify paper-infinitewp-FINAL-2026-11-04.md.asc — knell More, signed and timestamped: https://github.com/the-knell _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Infinitewp Client the Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Client the",
          "vendor": "Infinitewp",
          "versions": [
            {
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              "version": "unknown"
            }
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      "credits": [
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          "type": "finder",
          "value": "theknell--- via Fulldisclosure"
        }
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      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "InfiniteWP Client 1.13.10 \u2014 a WordPress management plugin on roughly\n200,000 installs \u2014 speaks to its management panel through two\nauthentication branches. The strong branch verifies an RSA\nsignature. The other, NOSSL, is selected by the enrolling panel\nsetting one request parameter, on hosts fully capable of RSA. Once\nits key is stored, the selection is permanent and the RSA branch is\nunreachable.\n\nThe stored key is generated as:\n\nmd5(base64_encode(panel_public_key) . rand(0, getrandmax()))\n\nThe public key is public. The secret is a single rand() result: at\nmost 2^31 values. The authentication value signs only the action\nand message ID \u2014 parameters are never signed \u2014 and message-ID\nordering is enforced only on the auto_login path, so a captured\nrequest replays with altered parameters.\n\nLive proof, against our own instance only: from one captured\nget_stats request and the panel\u0027s public key, the key was recovered\noffline in 291.9 seconds (~7.36M candidates/sec), byte-identical to\nthe site-issued key. A forged maintain_site command signed with the\nrecovered key was accepted and wrote database options that had not\nexisted before. The key never rotates: recover it once, forge\nforever.\n\nScope, stated plainly: every shipped copy carries the construction;\nexploitation requires a NOSSL-enrolled site. The NOSSL-enrolled\nshare of the 200,000 installs is not externally measurable and is\nnot claimed here.\n\nPaper: https://archive.org/details/knell-thirty-one-bits\nMirror: https://github.com/the-knell/Thirty-One-Bits\nKey: 133883AB9F6EDE5B9BA6B82E27BEDAF0CE152F25 (knell)\n\nVerify: gpg --import knell-public.asc, then\ngpg --verify paper-infinitewp-FINAL-2026-11-04.md.asc\n\n\u2014 knell\n\nMore, signed and timestamped: https://github.com/the-knell\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T02:14:17Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
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      "references": [
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          "tags": [
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        {
          "url": "https://github.com/the-knell/Thirty-One-Bits"
        },
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          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
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      ],
      "source": {
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        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "InfiniteWP Client: the NOSSL signing key has 31 bits of secret \u2014 recovered live in 291.9 seconds",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0559",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
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            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "ffbf24064fcb8b37240814c8af2947df39fc2eb5723a22882ef55cfd7f375cb6",
            "evidenceScore": 7,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/22",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-11-06T18:31:37Z"
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  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-13T02:14:17Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T02:14:17Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0559"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}



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