GCVE-1988-2026-0558
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 01:56 – Updated: 2026-11-13 01:56| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/19 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Struts2 Core |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Struts2 Core",
"vendor": "Apache",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Apache Struts2 Core, Apache Struts2 Convention Plugin, Apache Struts2 REST plugin, and the Apache Struts2 \nJavaTemplates plugin, Apache Struts2 Tiles plugin, etc., all versions \u003c=7.4.0/\u003c=6.12.0/etc., dereference or iterate \nover data that can be non-null -- such as an unmapped configuration lookup, an absent collection element, a failed \nbacking-store lookup, an unselected optional upload field, or an unresolved expression-language property, a security \npattern-matching call invoked with no candidate expression to test, or a missing bundle entry\u0027s substituted default \nmessage -- without first checking whether that value is `null`.\n\nImpact\nAny caller -- an attacker or an entirely ordinary user -- who executes a code path in which the underlying value is \nabsent or `null` (e.g., an incomplete configuration hierarchy, a missing or empty form field, a non-existent lookup \nkey, an unselected optional upload, or application data that simply does not expose the expected property) will cause \nan uncaught `NullPointerException` to bubble up the stack, resulting in a `500 Internal Server Error`. This may result \nin information disclosure -- either directly or otherwise - and, like all `500` responses, signals to malicious \nentities that the information system contains significant bugs, errors, and unintended side effects brought about by \nunexpected input and edge cases.\n\nWhile these may seem to merely be \"reliability bugs\", they undermine the availability of systems that rely upon the \nunderlying code, especially if the victim is on behind a load balancer or other front-end system that sees a `500 \nInternal Server Error` as a sign of an unhealthy environment and tears it down. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that \na configuration file or variable is non-null in development, staging, or elsewhere but not in production, resulting in \nunexpected exceptions and other issues that either were not identified during testing or could not have been identified \nin testing. It should also be noted that these kinds of issues are examples of poor coding standards, testing, and \nweak peer-review processes.\n\nExamples\nAs with many of the previously released advisories, there are many instances of this, so we will limit it to a subset \nof instances from which the others may be derived -- again, for the sake of brevity and because it simply isn\u0027t our job \nto enumerate all instances of a single vulnerable (like with the Struts2 insecure JSON deserialisation pathways where \nwe made clear the issue, mechanisms, and proof of concept while also citing sample responsible code and providing \ndetailed analysis thereof). Please excuse us for our terseness on this one -- we have written up many of these, as of \nlate, and the rather glaring theme and sheer number of issues makes such write-ups time consuming (old code or not, all \nof these are things that have been well-documented, frowned upon coding paradigms and constructs for literal decades, \nlong before any of the code in question was written) -- and this is all without getting into the more \"juicy\" findings.\n\nRangeValidatorSupport -- Null Elements\n`RangeValidatorSupport.validate(Object)`, in `struts2-core`, only `null`-checks the top-level array- or \n`Collection`-typed field before iterating over the elements and passing each one to `validateValue(Object, Comparable, \nT, T)`, which can call to `value.compareTo(min)` and `value.compareTo(max)` -- so a single `null` element inside an \notherwise non-`null` collection will cause a `NullPointerException`.\n\n```java\npublic void validate(Object object) throws ValidationException {\n Object obj = getFieldValue(getFieldName(), object);\n\n // if there is no value - don\u0027t do comparison\n // if a value is required, a required validator should be added to the field\n if (obj == null) {\n return;\n }\n\n T min = getMin();\n T max = getMax();\n\n if (obj.getClass().isArray()) {\n Object[] values = (Object[]) obj;\n for (Object objValue : values) {\n validateValue(object, (Comparable\u003cT\u003e) objValue, min, max);\n }\n } else if (Collection.class.isAssignableFrom(obj.getClass())) {\n Collection\u003c?\u003e values = (Collection\u003c?\u003e) obj;\n for (Object objValue : values) {\n validateValue(object, (Comparable\u003cT\u003e) objValue, min, max);\n }\n } else {\n validateValue(object, (Comparable\u003cT\u003e) obj, min, max);\n }\n}\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s \ncore/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/validator/validators/RangeValidatorSupport.java, lines 46-71\n\n```java\nprotected void validateValue(Object object, Comparable\u003cT\u003e value, T min, T max) {\n setCurrentValue(value);\n\n // only check for a minimum value if the min parameter is set\n if ((min != null) \u0026\u0026 (value.compareTo(min) \u003c 0)) {\n addFieldError(getFieldName(), object);\n }\n\n // only check for a maximum value if the max parameter is set\n if ((max != null) \u0026\u0026 (value.compareTo(max) \u003e 0)) {\n addFieldError(getFieldName(), object);\n }\n\n setCurrentValue(null);\n}\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/validator/validators/RangeValidatorSupport.java, \nlines 73-87, showing the unconditional `value.compareTo` dereference\n\nDoubleRangeValidator -- Null Elements\n`DoubleRangeFieldValidator`, in `struts2-core`, does not extend `RangeValidatorSupport\u003cT\u003e` the way that \n`IntRangeFieldValidator`, `LongRangeFieldValidator`, `ShortRangeFieldValidator`, and `LocalDateRangeFieldValidator` all \ndo -- it implements its own `validate(Object)`, `validateCollection(Double, Double, Double, Double, Collection)`, and \n`validateValue(Object, Double, Double, Double, Double)` methods -- and contains the identical problematic code but \nunder the `validate` to `validateCollection` pathway, which, again, only performs a nullness check on the top-level \nobject, but, this time, the exception occurs when `validateValue` unconditionally calls `Object.toString()` inside of a \ntry-catch block that only handles `NumberFormatException`.\n\n```java\n public void validate(Object object) throws ValidationException {\n String fieldName = getFieldName();\n Object obj = this.getFieldValue(fieldName, object);\n if (obj == null) {\n return;\n }\n\n Double maxInclusiveToUse = getMaxInclusive();\n Double minInclusiveToUse = getMinInclusive();\n Double maxExclusiveToUse = getMaxExclusive();\n Double minExclusiveToUse = getMinExclusive();\n\n if (obj.getClass().isArray()) {\n Object[] values = (Object[]) obj;\n validateCollection(maxInclusiveToUse, minInclusiveToUse, maxExclusiveToUse, minExclusiveToUse, \nArrays.asList(values));\n } else if (Collection.class.isAssignableFrom(obj.getClass())) {\n Collection values = (Collection) obj;\n validateCollection(maxInclusiveToUse, minInclusiveToUse, maxExclusiveToUse, minExclusiveToUse, values);\n } else {\n validateValue(obj, maxInclusiveToUse, minInclusiveToUse, maxExclusiveToUse, minExclusiveToUse);\n }\n }\n\n protected void validateCollection(Double maxInclusiveToUse, Double minInclusiveToUse, Double maxExclusiveToUse, \nDouble minExclusiveToUse, Collection values) {\n for (Object objValue : values) {\n validateValue(objValue, maxInclusiveToUse, minInclusiveToUse, maxExclusiveToUse, minExclusiveToUse);\n }\n }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s \ncore/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/validator/validators/DoubleRangeFieldValidator.java, lines 109-136, showing the \ntop-level-only null check at line 112 and `validateCollection()`\u0027s per-element iteration with no null check\n\n```java\n protected void validateValue(Object obj, Double maxInclusiveToUse, Double minInclusiveToUse, Double \nmaxExclusiveToUse, Double minExclusiveToUse) {\n try {\n setCurrentValue(obj);\n Double value = Double.valueOf(obj.toString());\n if ((maxInclusiveToUse != null \u0026\u0026 value.compareTo(maxInclusiveToUse) \u003e 0) ||\n (minInclusiveToUse != null \u0026\u0026 value.compareTo(minInclusiveToUse) \u003c 0) ||\n (maxExclusiveToUse != null \u0026\u0026 value.compareTo(maxExclusiveToUse) \u003e= 0) ||\n (minExclusiveToUse != null \u0026\u0026 value.compareTo(minExclusiveToUse) \u003c= 0)) {\n addFieldError(getFieldName(), value);\n }\n } catch (NumberFormatException e) {\n LOG.debug(\"Cannot validate value {} - not a Double\", obj, e);\n } finally {\n setCurrentValue(null);\n }\n }\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s \ncore/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/validator/validators/DoubleRangeFieldValidator.java, lines 138-153, showing the \nunconditional `obj.toString()` call and the `catch` clause that handles only `NumberFormatException`\n\nFileUploadAction/MultipleFileUploadUsingArrayAction -- Nullable Optional Upload\n`FileUploadAction.getUploadedFile()` and `MultipleFileUploadUsingArrayAction.upload()`, both in `struts2-showcase`, \ndereference or iterate over their respective `uploadedFile`/`uploadedFiles` fields without a nullness check, but \n`ActionFileUploadInterceptor`, in `struts2-core`, only ever assigns either field when at least one file was accepted \nfrom the multipart request -- leaving both fields `null` whenever the form is submitted without a file having been \nselected. Importantly, `struts2-showcase` is \"sample code\" and contains cross-site scripting (XSS) and various other \nissues (OGNL injection, of course), but we felt it important to show the code so that others are aware of how the \ninterceptor operates and to not use the sample code as any kind of a guide (for many reasons).\n\n```java\n public Object getUploadedFile() {\n return uploadedFile.getContent();\n }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-showcase`\u0027s \napps/showcase/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/showcase/fileupload/FileUploadAction.java, lines 66-68\n\n```java\n public String upload() throws Exception {\n System.out.println(\"\\n\\n upload2\");\n System.out.println(\"files:\");\n for (UploadedFile u : uploadedFiles) {\n System.out.println(\"*** \" + u + \"\\t\" + u.length());\n }\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-showcase`\u0027s \napps/showcase/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/showcase/fileupload/MultipleFileUploadUsingArrayAction.java, lines 41-45\n\n```java\n if (acceptedFiles.isEmpty()) {\n LOG.debug(\"No files have been uploaded/accepted\");\n } else {\n LOG.debug(\"Passing: {} uploaded file(s) to action\", acceptedFiles.size());\n action.withUploadedFiles(acceptedFiles);\n }\n\n // invoke action\n return invocation.invoke();\n```\nSnippet from `struts2-core`\u0027s core/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/interceptor/ActionFileUploadInterceptor.java, lines \n278-286, showing both fields left unset whenever no files are accepted\n\nSelectHandle -- Option Group Rendering Dereferences an Unresolved Lookup\n`SelectHandler.writeOptionGroup()`, in `struts2-javatemplates-plugin`, calls `toString()` directly on the object \nreturned by a value-stack lookup for a configured list-key or list-value property without a nullness check, even though \nthe sibling top-level list-rendering code in the very same class already null-checks the identical lookup before \ncalling `toString()` on it.\n\n```java\n Object tmpKey = stack.findValue(listKey != null ? listKey : \"top\");\n String tmpKeyStr = StringUtils.defaultString(tmpKey.toString());\n Object tmpValue = stack.findValue(listValue != null ? listValue : \"top\");\n String tmpValueStr = StringUtils.defaultString(tmpValue.toString());\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-javatemplates-plugin`\u0027s \nplugins/javatemplates/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/views/java/simple/SelectHandler.java, lines 135-138\n\n```java\n //key\n Object itemKey = findValue(listKey != null ? listKey : \"top\");\n "
}
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/19"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Apache Struts2 Core and Plugins \u003c=7.4.0 Multiple Null Pointer Exceptions",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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