GCVE-1988-2026-0552
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-13 01:41 – Updated: 2026-11-13 01:41| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Postecert FIRMAOK! |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Postecert FIRMAOK!",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Intilangelo, Andrea"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Postecert FIRMAOK! - Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability via OpenSSL Configuration (CVE-2026-9661)\n\n- Software Link:\n\nhttps://postecert.poste.it/firma/download.shtml\n\n- Affected Versions:\n\nVersion 1.6.29 (tested on Microsoft Windows 11 and 11 IoT Enterprise LTSC)\nOther versions may be affected as well.\n\n- Vulnerability Description:\n\n\nThe application relies on OpenSSL configuration paths influenced by the OPENSSLDIR environment variable. If this \nvariable is improperly\u00a0handled or trusted without validation, a low-privileged user can manipulate it to load malicious \nconfiguration files or libraries.\u00a0\nBecause the software is often used in shared or multi-user environments, this can lead to privilege escalation.\n\n- Proof of Concept:\n\n\nThe PoC in the original advisory demonstrates that a low-privileged local user can create a directory that does not \notherwise exist and cause the main application binary, \"launcher.exe\" (which launches multiple dependent executables, \nsuch as updater.exe and tslupdater.exe, which in turn load several additional libraries), to access attacker-controlled \nOpenSSL-related files from that location.\n\n- Impact:\n\n\nSince any user can execute it, the app runs with the same privileges as the user who launches it, any file it loads \nfrom that location will\u00a0also be trusted at that privilege level. This can be abused and leading to unauthorized \nprivilege gain as horizontal privilege escalation and possibly vertical\u00a0privilege escalation.\n\n- Disclosure Timeline:\n\n[18/04/2026] - Vulnerability discovered\n[23/04/2026] - CNA and vendor contacted\n[26/05/2026] - Vulnerability details provided - deadline set at 120 days, in accordance with the CNA disclosure policy\n[ meantime ] - Multiple follow-up attempts by the CNA to the vendor; no response\n[28/09/2026] - Deadline reached,\u00a0agreed with the CNA on an additional one-month extension\n[28/10/2026]\u00a0-\u00a0Revised deadline reached\n[06/11/2026] - Began the Public disclosure phase\n\n- CVE Reference:\n\nCVE-2026-9661 has been assigned to this vulnerability.\n\n- Credits:\n\nVulnerability discovered by Andrea Intilangelo\n\n- Original Advisory:\n\n\nhttps://olografix.org/acme/_poc/CVE-2026-9661.pdf\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T01:41:18Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/14"
},
{
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/14"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://olografix.org/acme/_poc/CVE-2026-9661.pdf"
},
{
"url": "https://postecert.poste.it/firma/download.shtml"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/14"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Postecert FIRMAOK! - Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability via OpenSSL Configuration (CVE-2026-9661)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0552",
"x_vulnarchive": {
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"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "831ee19cd1fc7336ec2956cf9a83d30b71c5dfd180d51b65e69df06bc3673a3e",
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"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-11-06T10:06:31Z"
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"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-13T01:41:18Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T01:41:18Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
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},
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
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