GCVE-1988-2026-0546
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 10:19 – Updated: 2026-11-02 10:19| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/9bbf046… | technical-description |
| https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/b… | technical-description |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Bugtraq AI is |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
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"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Jonathan Brossard"
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],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "This is bugtraq@bugtraq.ai, a new mailing list dedicated to the security\nof AI systems and the use of AI in security research.\nBugtraq AI is a sibling of the original Bugtraq list at\nsecurityfocus.com, which we are relaunching today after years of\nsilence. Same principles - full disclosure, researcher-first, no\ncorporate filter - applied to a domain that didn\u0027t exist when Bugtraq\nwas born in 1993 but now touches everything.\nWhat belongs here:\n- Vulnerabilities in AI/ML systems: model poisoning, training data\nextraction, prompt injection, inference attacks, jailbreaks with\nsecurity impact, supply chain issues in model distribution.\n- Offensive and defensive uses of AI in vulnerability research:\nautomated fuzzing, binary analysis, exploit generation, AI-assisted code\naudit.\n- Security implications of AI deployment: model serving infrastructure,\nAPI attack surfaces, embedded model security, agent frameworks.\n- Tooling, techniques, papers, and war stories.\nWhat doesn\u0027t belong here: hype, product launches, debates without a\ntechnical component, or anything you\u0027d post on LinkedIn.\nAI security is moving fast enough that the traditional conference cycle\ncan\u0027t keep up. Papers take months. Blog posts disappear into algorithmic\nfeeds. A mailing list is a permanent, searchable, citable record owned\nby the community - not by a platform that can change its terms tomorrow.\nThere is a deeper reason this list exists. We are entering an era where\nAI can generate plausible code, plausible advisories, and plausible\nexplanations of vulnerabilities - all of which may be wrong.\nDisinformation is no longer just a social media problem; it is a\ntechnical one. When a model hallucinates a CVE, or generates a patch\nthat looks correct but isn\u0027t, or produces an analysis that passes peer\nreview but not a proof checker - we have a truth problem.\nFormal methods and mathematical proofs are the antidote. A proof doesn\u0027t\ncare who generated it or how convincing the prose around it sounds. It\neither holds or it doesn\u0027t. As AI systems become both the subject and\nthe tool of security research, the ability to formally verify claims -\nabout code, about vulnerabilities, about the models themselves - becomes\nnot academic but essential.\nThis list welcomes that work. If you\u0027re applying formal verification to\nAI systems, using proof assistants to validate security properties, or\nbuilding tooling that replaces trust with proof - this is the place.\nThe format is old. The problem space is new. That\u0027s the point.\nPost something."
}
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"url": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@bugtraq.ai/message/6ZEX4GCNZEATYIDGO52K37PKMGJCYNAJ/"
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"source": {
"defect": [
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],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[Bugtraq] Bugtraq AI is live",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.