GCVE-1988-2026-0542
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 10:19 – Updated: 2026-11-02 10:19| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/ade94a8… | technical-description |
| https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/b… | technical-description |
| http://osuosl.org | |
| http://slackware.com | |
| http://slackware.com/gpg-key |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | groff SSA:2026-271-01 |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
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"product": "groff SSA:2026-271-01",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
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"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA1\n[slackware-security] groff (SSA:2026-271-01)\nNew groff packages are available for Slackware 15.0 and -current to\nfix security issues.\nHere are the details from the Slackware 15.0 ChangeLog:\n+--------------------------+\npatches/packages/groff-1.24.2-i586-1_slack15.0.txz: Upgraded.\nThis release corrects command injection security vulnerabilities\n(CWE-78) in the mmroff, pdfmom, and pre-grohtml programs. The last of\nthese is a preprocessor that is run when groff or troff is run with the\n`-T html` or `-T xhtml` options. The vulnerabilities are variously\n14-26 years old. Malicious input can escape groff\u0027s default \"safer\"\nmode, running commands embedded in that input at the user\u0027s privilege\nlevel. The groff development team recommends this release to any users\nwho employ the named tools or GNU troff output formats with untrusted\ninputs.\n(* Security fix *)\n+--------------------------+\nWhere to find the new packages:\n+-----------------------------+\nThanks to the friendly folks at the OSU Open Source Lab\n(http://osuosl.org) for donating FTP and rsync hosting\nto the Slackware project! :-)\nAlso see the \"Get Slack\" section on http://slackware.com for\nadditional mirror sites near you.\nUpdated package for Slackware 15.0:\nftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-15.0/patches/packages/groff-1.24.2-i586-1_slack15.0.txz\nUpdated package for Slackware x86_64 15.0:\nftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-15.0/patches/packages/groff-1.24.2-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz\nUpdated package for Slackware -current:\nftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware-current/slackware/ap/groff-1.24.2-i686-1.txz\nUpdated package for Slackware x86_64 -current:\nftp://ftp.slackware.com/pub/slackware/slackware64-current/slackware64/ap/groff-1.24.2-x86_64-1.txz\nMD5 signatures:\n+-------------+\nSlackware 15.0 package:\n5b0814be7faa04c5a49b427284a3939c groff-1.24.2-i586-1_slack15.0.txz\nSlackware x86_64 15.0 package:\n08206f4da8fff6ff5f3b4ec6002709d0 groff-1.24.2-x86_64-1_slack15.0.txz\nSlackware -current package:\nccb67b1b8ea71f73e782eaf583618cef ap/groff-1.24.2-i686-1.txz\nSlackware x86_64 -current package:\n095b89f3a0d615db6dda508ba34c7972 ap/groff-1.24.2-x86_64-1.txz\nInstallation instructions:\n+------------------------+\nUpgrade the package as root:\n# upgradepkg groff-1.24.2-i586-1_slack15.0.txz\n+-----+\nSlackware Linux Security Team\nhttp://slackware.com/gpg-key\nsecurity@slackware.com\n+------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| To leave the slackware-security mailing list: |\n+------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| Send an email to majordomo@slackware.com with this text in the body of |\n| the email message: |\n| |\n| unsubscribe slackware-security |\n| |\n| You will get a confirmation message back containing instructions to |\n| complete the process. Please do not reply to this email address. |\n+------------------------------------------------------------------------+\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\niHkEARECADkWIQTsVknaQB4iq/pnNu9qRGPAQBAiMwUCarroTRsUgAAAAAAEAA5t\nYW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwyLDIACgkQakRjwEAQIjM2UgCffTR2rW9LGyHuwSnryafP\nUmjBHPUAn2B1kDZZFl4xddxybfY8ePZquG0c\n=ZwYn\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----"
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{
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"source": {
"defect": [
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[Bugtraq] [slackware-security] groff (SSA:2026-271-01)",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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