GCVE-1988-2026-0541
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 10:19 – Updated: 2026-11-02 10:19| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | AI security |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "AI security",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Filip Palian"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Hello there,\nNice to see the list being back online. Let\u0027s see how it will complement\nthe oss-sec and full-disclosure at this stage.\nUsing the occasion, the following resources are worth sharing:\n* https://vuln.cs.berkeley.edu/ - An open record of the CVEs discovered by\nagentic systems, updated daily, built to surface research gaps, identify\nregressions in specific vulnerability classes, and map where agentic\nsecurity work is gaining ground.\n* https://genai.owasp.org/introduction-genai-security-project/ - Eighteen\nmonths ago, a small group of security professionals and AI researchers\nidentified a major security challenge emerging in the fast-paced world of\ngenerative AI: the lack of comprehensive guidance on securing large\nlanguage models (LLMs). As businesses rapidly adopted LLMs, concerns around\nadversarial attacks, data leakage, prompt injection, and governance risks\ngrew. However, structured security frameworks for AI were largely absent.\n* https://atlas.mitre.org/ - ATLAS (Adversarial Threat Landscape for\nArtificial-Intelligence Systems) is a globally accessible, living knowledge\nbase of adversary tactics and techniques against Al-enabled systems based\non real-world attack observations and realistic demonstrations from Al red\nteams and security groups.\n* https://portswigger.net/web-security/llm-attacks - Organizations are\nrushing to integrate Large Language Models (LLMs) in order to improve their\nonline customer experience. This exposes them to web LLM attacks that take\nadvantage of the model\u0027s access to data, APIs, or user information that an\nattacker cannot access directly.\nHH,\nFP"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T10:19:26Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/item/f0c9fb59461c76f9649769e72cc47ce19cb6461bc7a5621aeb25b39e721b453f"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@bugtraq.ai/message/QOHOQVYGW5CHIZIRWPOYC2GLEJ6BB4E6/"
},
{
"url": "https://atlas.mitre.org/"
},
{
"url": "https://genai.owasp.org/introduction-genai-security-project/"
},
{
"url": "https://portswigger.net/web-security/llm-attacks"
},
{
"url": "https://vuln.cs.berkeley.edu/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"CAN10O-aw372Mvwe09CbKVZG%2Bu0d9qTVXJxbnS2wXrpAqfzzR-g%40mail.gmail.com"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[Bugtraq] AI security",
"x_gcve": [
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"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0541",
"x_vulnarchive": {
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"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "f0c9fb59461c76f9649769e72cc47ce19cb6461bc7a5621aeb25b39e721b453f",
"evidenceScore": 6,
"messageId": "CAN10O-aw372Mvwe09CbKVZG%2Bu0d9qTVXJxbnS2wXrpAqfzzR-g%40mail.gmail.com",
"originalUrl": "https://lists.securityfocus.com/hyperkitty/list/bugtraq@bugtraq.ai/message/QOHOQVYGW5CHIZIRWPOYC2GLEJ6BB4E6/",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-11-02T10:19:26Z"
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.